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China has accomplished remarkable economic achievement during the past several decades. Yet, it 
has been confronted with unprecedented, overwhelming pressures to address its severe environmental 
challenges, both from domestic and international societies—all the more since the world has become 
increasingly critical on non-sustainable developmental strategies. While the corporate environmentalism 
literature has shed light on how different stakeholders such as government, industry, and civil society can 
exert their influences on corporate environmentalism in developed economies, there is a dearth in both 
theories and empirics that explain (1) the complexity within a single constituent that could be impactful 
through multiple and sometimes contradictory expectations on firm behaviors, (2) the environmental 
strategies in the business group form that is prevalent in Asian and emerging economies, and (3) how the 
world’s largest emerging economy, China, is addressing its environmental problems in an almost utterly 
different context.
I build on corporate environmentalism, business group, and China studies literatures in an attempt 
to reveal a comprehensive picture of how different external and internal forces jointly influence the 
corporate environmental strategies in the emerging economy of China. Findings from two empirical 
studies exploring corporate environmental strategies in Chinese firms suggest that (1) the Chinese state 
has multiple faces at different levels in the political hierarchy, exerting non-concerted influences on 
corporate environmental practices, (2) there is heterogeneity among Chinese business group affiliates on 
environmental strategies caused by their pressure sensitive and pressure resistant attributes. 
Jointly, these two studies offer a novel, more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms that impact 
corporate environmentalism. The findings from this dissertation are not only applicable to China but also 
to other settings, including developed federal states where decentralized autonomy prevails as well as 
other emerging economies where the business group is an important economic force.
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PREFACE 
 
 
In my final year of high school, I claimed that I would go for business schools after getting 
some sophisticated knowledge of mathematics and logical way of thinking from an 
engineering school. As I look back now, I am not sure whether I really knew what it meant 
back then, as I did not even know what engineering or business was. Oddly enough, I 
really followed that track, even though I made some “detours” to an economic school after 
college. RSM “happened” to be the only management school for PhD studies on my 
application list. But after I had a Skype interview with Pursey and Frank, I felt that was it. 
I still remember the first days when I could not understand anything in the field. Coming 
with engineering and economics background, every paper here to me was a nice piece of 
story. Luckily, the more time I spend in this field, the more fascinating I find conducting 
research in a management school is. There are such a numerous variety of theoretical 
domains, empirical settings, and intriguing phenomenon that I could touch upon solely 
based on my interest, refreshing my mindset and keeping me excited all the time.  
I was concerned about the natural environment that I had been living in before I 
started my PhD project. In 2012, there was news indicating that seven out of the ten most 
polluted cities in the world were in China. Doing the PhD not only enriched my academic 
skills, but offered me deeper and more positive insights on the severe environmental 
challenges China faces with. The more I look into how the environmental issues have been 
addressed in China, the less negative I became. In September 2016, of the world’s ten most 
polluted cities released by the WHO, two cities were from China. Admittedly the smog in 
China will not disappear in a day, but I believe that things are moving towards a positive 
direction. With the strong hands of the Chinese state, the increasingly compliant and 
voluntarily responsible firms, and the ever-improved awareness of environmental issues in 
the civil society, the effectiveness of the environmental institutions will make great 
progress eventually. 
 This dissertation would not exist had it not been the support I got from, but not 
limited to, the people and organizations I thank below. I can not thank enough for the great 
guide my promoter, Professor Pursey Heugens, has offered me. He has shaped my attitude 
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towards being an academic, encouraged me to enjoy conducting research out of my own 
interest, and showed me how a sharp mind should work. His wisdom also enlightened my 
perception of the world. I am incredibly grateful for his unconditional and unlimited 
support for me and his unreserved trust on me throughout my doctoral trajectory. He is the 
mentor of my career and my life. 
Dr. Frank Wijen is my daily supervisor. I would not have realized the 
improvement in so many aspects such as my language skills, logical thinking, and even the 
way I deal with people if it were not Frank’s patient guidance. He gave me many insightful 
and professional advices, generously passing on to me his experiences and lessons on both 
research and teaching activities. Such knowledge will equip me for my whole career. I am 
extremely grateful that I could have this great supervisory team that not only are great co-
authors to collaborate with, but truly light up the future for me both in career and life. 
 I am also very fortunate to have been encouraged by many magnificent 
individuals. Professor Jianjun Zhang, my host in Guanghua Management School at Peking 
University, I thank him for sharing his wisdom and knowledge on so many topics we have 
discussed. His understanding of the Chinese context has always inspired me. I would like 
to thank Professor Chris Marquis for his invaluable advice to me on different occasions 
throughout my entire PhD trajectory as well as for being such a generous and supporting 
referee during my job application process. Professor Gengshen Zhao, I thank him for his 
tremendous support and effort in recommending me to a lot of contacts for my field study. 
The insights I got from the qualitative study are immeasurable. Special thanks also to Dr. 
Jochem Kroezen and Dr. Mia Raynard for many insightful feedback on my research 
projects during the early stages of my PhD.  
 My colleagues and my friends made my PhD journey colorful. Roxana and 
Jacomijn, I can not imagine how bored I would have been in Room T7-01 if it were not 
them alongside me all the time. Pengfei, my academic older brother, I will miss his 
sarcasm and the sweet ladies of his family. Qiushi, glad we explored almost every piece of 
the Netherlands together (I still have four provinces left that we can go in the future!). 
Wenting, I do not feel lonely having her in Rotterdam. Heather, thanks for all the fun at 
home and the thoughtful conversations. I hope we will continue with the help of Internet 
and letters. Debbie, Diana, Dongnan, Guoliang, Hendra, Ingrid, Jing Li, Jing Wu, Jingjing 
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Liu, Kati, Joost, Lameez, Mirko, Qiaomei, Qin Su, Qinghong, Riccardo, Rick, Saeedeh, 
Thijs, Ting Xiao, Wei Sun, Yanwei, Yang Feng, Yifei, Ying Feng, Ying Geng, Ying 
Zhang, Yingjie, Yiyun, Yuanyuan, Yunlong, and many other individuals, thank you all for 
the good memories we share. I look forward to meeting each of you in every corner of the 
world in the next ten years. I would also like to take this chance to thank Carolien, Patricia, 
Miho, Kim, Tineke, Natalija, and Marleen for their kind and patient support on all kinds of 
administrative issues. I must also thank CSC, my department of Strategic Management and 
Entrepreneurship at RSM, ERIM, and Erasmus Trustfond for their generous support. 
 I would like to express my deepest love with my family. My parents, my 
grandparents, aunt Ren and uncle Zhao, my parents in law, Xiaoxiao, and Xiangyun, thank 
you that you have always been there for me. I will make every effort to make sure that we 
see each other more often from now on. ZUO Wei, we have had so many sweet memories 
since 2009, and I look forward to continuing our exciting lives together. 
 
 
 
 
WANG Ruxi 
王汝曦 
 
Beijing, 
April, 2017    
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Chapter 1.  Introduction  
 
 
 
 
1.1 Corporate Environmentalism 
 
The world’s largest economy (measured by Gross Domestic Product by purchasing power 
parity), China, has caught tremendous attention over the globe in the past decade as the 
world’s largest greenhouse gases emitter and energy consumer (World Bank, 2015). China 
is also a prominent example of an emerging economy whose environmental impact has 
been non-negligible yet studied relatively little compared with the research already done in 
developed countries. An in-depth investigation on the management of the natural 
environment and energy consumption in emerging economies, especially China is, 
therefore, of paramount importance. Research shedding light on how corporate 
environmental practices in China is (in)effectively addressed and reinforced by the public 
and private sectors, as will be shown in this dissertation, is profoundly meaningful and 
closely relevant to the welfare of mankind and the way business and society interact and 
move forward together.  
Since the degradation of the natural environment over the globe manifested in 
global warming, deforestation, air pollution, etc., increasingly extensive concerns, 
discussions, and debates among policy makers, civil society, and industrial firms have 
been invoked in the past several decades. With this trend, the perceptions and 
interpretations of corporate environmentalism among firms, government, and the public 
has been ever-changing and evolving (Banerjee, 2001; Chrun, Dolšak, and Prakash, 2016; 
Hoffman, 2001). In the 1970s, firms carried out environmental performances as required 
by law, given such activities were considered a threat to the ultimate corporate goal of the 
maximization of profit (Hoffman, 2001). Later, both societal and scholarly emphasis on 
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corporate benign environmental practice started to change dramatically. Environmental 
issues have always been brought up as a more pressing and salient topic, especially after 
the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992 (Etzion, 2007). 
From the 1990s, scholars have started to use various theoretical lenses such as 
corporate political activities, resource-based view, and stakeholder theory to investigate the 
mechanisms driving firms to behave environmentally responsibly and assess the related 
financial and societal impacts. Studies have shown that firms perform in an 
environmentally friendly way to comply with government regulations (Delmas and Toffel, 
2004), to outcompete their rivals in the market (Bremmers et al., 2007), and to respond to 
demands by their local communities and customers (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996). The 
terminology on corporate environmental strategies ranges from phrases such as “corporate 
environmental commitment”, “ecologically sustainable strategies”, and “sustaincentric 
paradigm” to “corporate environmentalism” (Banerjee, 2002). By definition, corporate 
environmentalism is “the process by which firms address environmental issues and 
develop environmental management strategies” (Banerjee, 2001: 489-490), integrated 
together with the financial goals into their corporate mission (Etzion, 2007). Below, I 
provide a brief description of each of the major theoretical arenas explaining the 
mechanisms for the effectiveness of corporate environmentalism.  
The first group of scholars view corporate environmentalism as a type of political 
activity. Through activities such as lobbying and building political connections, firms 
reduce uncertainty and exert influence in the policy-making process (Hillman, Keim, and 
Schuler, 2004). In the context of corporate environmentalism, instead of showing how the 
firms could “manipulate” or shape the regulatory decisions, studies have shown that firms 
practice in an environmentally friendly way in order to seek for political legitimacy as a 
critical strategic resource (Marquis and Qian, 2014; Luo, Wang and Zhang, 2016). In such 
an intersection of corporate political strategies and corporate environmentalism, research 
has been featuring studies on corporate environmental and social practices in China, the 
largest yet complicated autocratic country in the world facing increasingly severe 
environmental and social challenges. This line of research takes the perspective that the 
government is the dominant actor which sends out strong signals through both coercive 
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and normative channels by issuing stringent regulations and supportive guidelines to push 
forward corporate environmentalism (Child, Lu, and Tsai, 2007). 
Scholars using a resource-based view argue that the possession of resources and 
capabilities that are valuable and hard to imitate are the premise to sustain a competitive 
advantage (Hart, 1995). In the context of corporate environmentalism, not only scholars 
but also the industries have been aware that the capability of balancing economic and 
environmental sustainable developments has become a crucial competitive advantage (Hart, 
1995; Judge and Douglas, 1998; Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998). The resources and 
legitimacy firms gain through corporate environmental practices secure their survival and 
growth (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Chrun et al., 2016). In China, in particular, firms carry out 
environmental performances in order to seek for legitimacy from the government and the 
society as a strategic resource for their future development (Li, Meng, Zhang, and Zhou, 
2008; Marquis and Qian, 2014).  For instance, the strategic usage of political connections 
and the possession of business group resources endows firms with competitive advantages 
and drives them to respond to environmental pressures differently. This line of research 
attributes the various corporate environmental performances to the necessity to remain 
legitimate or the privilege firms bolster because of the critical resources the firms retain.  
The research stream of stakeholder theory centers on the importance of 
maintaining a good relationship with groups or individuals that can affect or are affected 
by the firms (Freeman, 1984). The incentive of practicing corporate environmentalism is 
emanated from the recognition of stakeholder interests (Banerjee, 2001). While some 
studies showed that legitimacy or reputation might be sustained among the stakeholders at 
the expense of shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 2002), others contend that competitive 
advantage could be achieved with a sustainable strategy (Hart and Milstein, 2003; Porter 
and Vander Linde, 1995). In the context of corporate environmentalism, stakeholders 
primarily consist of governments who are the environmental regulators (Henriques and 
Sadorsky, 1999), public interest groups such as local community and environmental 
activists (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998), and market-related actors such as customers and 
suppliers (Darnall, Henriques and Sadorsky, 2010).  
In pluralistic and democratic societies, stakeholder theory is normally the most 
preferred lens, as the multiple stakeholders mentioned above function almost equivalently 
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in those contexts. In the western societies, non-government organizations (NGOs) raise the 
public environmental awareness in civil society, and forcefully push the progress of 
environmental regulatory actions (Child et al., 2007; Egri and Herman, 2000; Yaziji and 
Doh, 2009). On the other hand, in a state featuring centralization and autocracy such as 
China, environmental initiatives are planned and designed by the state, implemented by its 
different departments and local branches, and if any, only morally supported by the NGOs 
and in the civil society. Therefore, in such contexts like China where environmental 
requirements from multiple stakeholders are rare, corporate political activity and resource-
based view appear to be much more relevant for the exploration of corporate 
environmentalism.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The discussion of the literature in the field of corporate environmentalism has revealed a 
few major theoretical and empirical puzzles. First, understanding how the complexity 
within a single entity could bring any differentiated impact to corporate environmental 
performances requires both nuanced theoretical lens and rich empirical context. The 
current literature has an underlying assumption that every constituent sets consistent 
expectations and thus exerts monolithic influences on firms. So far, we have limited 
understanding of the multifacetedness in a seemingly unitary entity and its related impact 
on corporate environmental performances. Especially when studying governmental 
influences on corporate environmentalism, most of the studies solely focused on a state’s 
consistent and coercive functions with a clear set of expectations vis-à-vis firms. We have 
little knowledge of how firms react if different levels of a state exert divergent demands. 
Moreover, when such a multifaceted state is of dominant importance to business 
development, it is more crucial for firms to respond strategically to the different demands. 
The different priorities between economic and sustainable development the Chinese central 
and local government hold offer an extraordinary context to investigate such a research gap. 
As such, the first research question I address in this dissertation is:  
 
1. What is the influence of the multifaceted state on corporate environmentalism 
in China? 
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Second, the transition in organizational forms as global industrial production 
shifts from the West to especially China has been largely overlooked. In other words, to 
get a comprehensive view of how the effectiveness of environmental institutions could be 
achieved in the largest economy in the world, China, the field of corporate 
environmentalism begs for a much more careful check on the most prevalent and impactful 
organizational form, business group in this economy. Students have explored the separate 
influences of the state, civil society, and industry on the firm.  Moreover, scholars in the 
arena of business group studies have shed much light on the comparison between business 
group and standalone firms. Yet, both fields have remained silent on business group 
affiliates and their environmental strategies as a specific unit of analysis. The important 
number of Chinese business group affiliates, the complex nature within the business 
groups they belong to, and their contribution to the Chinese economy, or even the world 
economy, have provided a rich context to address this research gap. As such, the second 
research question I address in this dissertation is: 
 
2. What economic and political factors can exert influences on the propensity of a 
Chinese business group affiliate to adopt an environmental management system? 
 
In order to set the stage for the aforementioned central research questions, in the 
rest of this chapter, I will first provide an overview of the ongoing situation of 
environmental protection in China and then summarize each of the two studies in this 
dissertation. 
1.3 Environmental Protection in China 
Since the Open-door Policy in 1978, China has started to resume its prominent leading 
position in the world economy as it did multiple times centuries ago. It is unfortunate that 
as a developing economy, China followed the developmental trajectories of presently 
developed western countries by sacrificing the natural environment for economic 
prosperity (World Resources Institute, 2014). On the positive side, China has been 
restructuring its major sectors and has made great effort for more sustainable economic 
development. On September 3, 2016, the eve of the G20 summit, together with the former 
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US president Barack Obama, the Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that the world’s 
two biggest greenhouse emitters will formally ratify the Paris climate change agreement 
(The Guardian, 2016). This signifies that the Chinese central government and the leading 
party commit themselves to conserving resources and protecting the environment, also 
specified as one of the fundamental national policies. As a matter of fact, the 
environmental protection issue requires efforts from not only the government but also 
corporations and civil society. I will provide a general overview of how the government 
and business are addressing the environmental issues in China together in this section. 
More details will be discussed in separate chapters in this dissertation. 
1.3.1 Structure in the state for environmental issues 
As the largest autocratic country in the world, China has a highly hierarchical political 
system. The National People’s Congress (NPC), the State Council, and the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) Central Committee are the three supreme state organs on the central 
level that are empowered with the top rights for country level decisions and administration. 
One of the nine special committees under the NPC, the Environmental Protection and 
Resources Conservation Committee, takes the responsibility to examine and draw up bills 
and to assist the NPC and its Standing Committee in their legislative and oversight work 
related to the environmental field. As important parts of the State Council, several 
coordinating organs, ministries and commissions take charge of issues related to the 
environment, energy and climate change, namely, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR), 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the National Leading Group on Climate Change (NLGCC), 
the State Council Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Leading Group 
(SCECERLG), and the National Energy Commission (NEC).   
A set of targets on the country level will be issued by one or several relevant 
governmental organs at the ministerial level under the State Council first to address a 
major issue according to the strategic plan from the Central Committee of CPC, the State 
Council, and the NPC for the country. Then all the relevant governmental organs at the 
ministerial (state) level work out detailed regulations, laws, plans, measurements, or 
standards to implement the plans. Almost each of the organizations at the central 
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government level (the NPC and the different departments of the State Council) has 
branches in local areas, ranging from provincial, to municipal, county, and township levels. 
In the detailed plans, tasks will be allocated from the central government to local levels 
through the political hierarchy. Later, specific targets will be made for each involved 
corporation to complete the assigned tasks in the local area.  
The implementation of the corporate environmental targets is primarily supervised 
by the different levels of the Chinese state, rarely with the help of the civil society and the 
media. Activities that might invoke conflicts, spontaneously or with the help of NGOs, are 
implicitly not advocated and very often restricted in China (Ho, 2001). Therefore, 
environmental NGOs in China seek to guide the public to be aware of the environmental 
issues and to serve as helping hands for the government, rather than generate more 
conflicts in society and complaining about the government’s performances (China 
Development Brief, 2013; Ho, 2001).  
One drawback of the state’s multi-level branches in the local area is that they have 
dual identities: they are governed both vertically and horizontally (Tsang and Kolk, 2010). 
Thus, a local branch is vertically governed through a vertical hierarchy by its relevant 
ministry at the central level; meanwhile, it is a part of the geographical local government 
horizontally. The vertically related organizations have the same goal of solving issues in a 
certain field, while the horizontal relationship requires a focus on local development. 
When the local government and the organs from the State Council have different demands 
and expectations on how a region should develop, a conflict of interests emerges (Child et 
al., 2007; Luo et al., 2016). I will elaborate on the conflict of interests within the Chinese 
government and its impact on corporate environmentalism among local firms in further 
details in Chapter 2.  
1.3.2 Structure in business for environmental issues 
Hierarchy prevails in Asian cultures, especially China, not only in the political system but 
also in the structure of business. In the most prevalent organizational form of business 
group in China, execution and supervision of regulations are also implemented through the 
hierarchy within the groups. Confronted with the social and regulatory pressures brought 
along by their environmental challenges, firms not only listen to the pertinent government 
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(Child et al., 2007) but also are obliged to complete the tasks their business groups have 
assigned to them as subordinates (Vissa et al., 2010). 
As illustrated in Section 1.3.1, targets and  plans on environmental performances 
are firstly worked out by the central state, followed by concrete implementation led by 
local governments. At this stage, detailed targets are assigned, specifically for many 
related firms individually to complete the assigned tasks, not only for the state but also for 
the business groups. On the one hand, firms listen to the local government or their 
controlling government and strategically carry out environmental performances in order to 
balance the different demands from different levels of the state (for a detailed elaboration, 
see Chapter 2). On the other hand, the environmental performances of business group 
affiliates are also monitored and regulated through the hierarchical system within their own 
business groups. For instance, if a business group receives environmental obligatory 
targets from the central level, it will act accordingly by specifying and assigning more 
concrete targets and tasks to all of its affiliates across the country. Just as the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection has its local branches of the Environmental Protection Bureau in 
the political system, an affiliated firm also has a Department of Environmental 
Protection/Energy Saving as a corresponding unit to the Section of Environmental 
Protection/Energy Saving at the group level to receive orders and implement corporate 
plans. The environmental practices among business group affiliates, as evidenced in 
Chapter 3, diverge as well, not only because they belong to different business groups but 
also because different organizational factors encourage or dissuade such practices among 
the affiliates. I will further investigate these attributes at both the group and the affiliate 
levels in Chapter 3. 
1.4 Dissertation Overview 
The dissertation consists of two studies that have several attributes in common. First, both 
studies aim to expand the current scope of corporate environmentalism to China, a major 
economic context that has received scant scholarly attention despite the major 
environmental implications of its economic activities. Second, each study explores 
corporate environmental performances and their related strategies as they are influenced by 
external constituencies, such as the state and business group attributes. Third, both studies 
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employ a specific quantitative method, panel data analysis, to test the proposed statistical 
models. Other than these similarities, the two studies are quite distinct from each other. An 
overview showing how the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 of the dissertation explored the 
multifacetedness of the state and business group influence, respectively, is provided in 
Table 1.1. In the remaining sections of this chapter, a brief summary is provided for each 
of the two studies. 
Table 1.1 Overview of the constructs of the studies in this dissertation 
 Study 1 (Chapter 2) Study 2 (Chapter 3) 
Title Government’s green grip: 
multifaceted state influence on 
corporate environmental 
practices in China 
Differences in environmental 
management system adoption 
(EMS) among Chinese 
business group affiliates 
Phenomenon Corporate environmental 
practices 
Affiliate adoption of an EMS 
Manifestation of the 
multifacetedness 
Hierarchical state level of 
controlling entity, dominant 
controlling power in China 
Structural position in a 
business group, dominant 
organizational form in China 
Theoretical lens Government influence, political 
activity 
Business group strategy 
Analytical method Manual secondary data 
collection, in-depth interviews, 
content analysis, panel data 
analysis 
Manual secondary data 
collection, panel data analysis, 
case illustration 
Major contribution Disentangling the varied roles 
of different levels of 
government on corporate 
environmentalism 
Understanding the drivers of 
the different environmental 
practices among the business 
group affiliates 
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1.4.1 Study 1: Government’s green grip: Multifaceted state influence on corporate 
environmental practices in China 
The first study probes into the impact of the multiple governments at different levels 
within the Chinese autocratic state on corporate environmentalism in China. In this study, I 
challenge the assumption in the extant literature that governmental influence on corporate 
environmental performances is monolithic, with clear and consistent expectations vis-à-vis 
firms. In the Chinese context, on the one hand, inferior levels of the state listen to their 
superiors as power travels through the political hierarchy, pushing corporate 
environmentally friendly performances. On the other hand, due to the political autonomy 
also granted by the central government, local states at the farther end from the central on 
the political hierarchical spectrum become impactful as well, with an inclination to 
prioritize regional economic development. I investigate how such a complex state 
apparatus in China spurs different reactions among firms, as evidenced by their 
environmental practices. 
I manually collected 480 firm-year observations, spanning the period from 2008 
to 2012. Using content and panel data analysis (random effect regressions), I show that the 
hierarchical level of the state body controlling a firm and the firm’s environmental 
practices are related in an inverted U-shaped way. In addition, further analysis reveals that 
such an inverted U-shaped influence is strengthened by regulatory stringency, and 
weakened by state financial participation. To facilitate the interpretation of the statistical 
results, I have also conducted over 60 hours of in-depth interviews with representatives of 
Chinese firms, different levels of government, and environmental NGOs. The qualitative 
evidence from these interviews helps us to more deeply understand the multifaceted state 
influence. This paper primarily contributes to the corporate environmentalism literature by 
exploring the influence exerted by the diversity of power and expectations from and within 
a single state on corporate environmental practices. 
1.4.2 Study 2: Differences in Environmental Management System Adoption among 
Chinese Business Group Affiliates 
The second study unpacks the influence of pressure sensitivity and pressure resistance on 
the different strategic adoption of an environmental management system (EMS). In this 
study, I distinguish the factors that make business group affiliates pressure sensitive and 
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pressure resistant. I argue that pressure sensitivity stems from the social needs the affiliates 
need to maintain their social capital and brand image. On the other hand, pressure 
resistance emanates from the privileges the affiliates enjoy because of their organizational 
and group-level attributes. 
I manually collected 732 firm-year observations of 166 business group affiliates 
spanning the period of 2008 to 2012. These observations are all listed firms with their main 
business in the traditional environmentally demanding sectors. Using panel data analysis 
(probit and logit random effect regressions), I show that being affiliated with a family-
owned business group and having a Business-to-Consumer model increases the sensitivity 
the affiliates are confronted with, pushing them to adopt an EMS. Furthermore, being a 
core member of a business group and having corporate political connections adds to the 
resistance towards the adoption of an EMS. In this study, I have two major contributions. 
First, I extend the ongoing conversation from a comparison of business group affiliates and 
standalone firms to a discussion on the different strategic choices among business group 
affiliates. Second, as the center of global economic development has shifted from 
developed countries to emerging economies, I explore the most prevalent organizational 
form in the largest emerging economy in China, the business group.  
1.5 Declaration of Contribution 
I (hereinafter ‘the author’) declare my contribution to each of the chapters in this 
dissertation and acknowledge the contributions of other people that have been involved. 
Chapter 1:  The author has completed this chapter primarily on her own, with the 
feedback from the supervisory team. 
Chapter 2: The majority of the work in this chapter has been completed by the 
author in collaboration with her supervisory team (i.e. Professor Dr. Pursey P.M.A.R. 
Heugens and Dr. Frank Wijen). Different versions of this paper has been presented in 
several international conferences, one of which was collected in the best paper proceedings 
at a conference, and a recent version is currently under review at a top management journal. 
The author is the first author, the daily supervisor second, and the promoter third.  
Chapter 3: The majority of the work in this chapter has been completed by the 
author in collaboration with her supervisory team. This paper has been presented in an 
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international conference, and is currently in preparation to submit to a top management 
journal. The author of this dissertation is the first author of the paper, the promoter second, 
and the daily supervisor third. 
1.6 Conclusion 
The research presented in this dissertation aims to advance the understanding of the 
corporate environmentalism in China. Theoretically, it offers novel perspectives to unveil 
the complexity of the influence a single entity, the state, exerts on corporate 
environmentalism, and to unpack the factors causing the heterogeneity in strategic choices 
within a same organizational form, the business group. Empirically, the dissertation covers 
the major mechanisms through which corporate environmental practices in Chinese listed 
firms could be affected by external formal influences, including two opposing effects, 
(mounting pressure and increasing autonomy) brought along by the different expectations 
and priorities of various levels of the state, as well as the pressure resistance and pressure 
sensitivity business group affiliates possess. Practically, it is impactful as it plots a deep 
and comprehensive picture for practitioners around the globe to better understand the 
effectiveness of the environmental institutions in China. For instance, performing business 
with China under the backdrop of a sustainable developmental strategy advocated by the 
central government, firms or governments from developed economies could understand 
and/or cooperate with their Chinese competitors or partners better by sorting out where 
they are positioned in the political hierarchy and business group structure, analyze the 
environmental pressures they might be confronted with, and attune the development of 
their strategies. It also reminds the public policy makers for environmental solutions to 
keep a closer eye on the conflicts from within the bureaucratic system rather than from the 
outside. 
As China is facing increasingly important environmental challenges and 
worldwide critique, especially over the past five to ten years, as the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases and the leading consumer of non-renewable energy, its influence on the 
global climate change begs for immediate, effective, and united actions to solve its major 
environmental problems. Given the importance of the Chinese economy, the outcomes of 
this study have repercussions stretching beyond the Chinese context. This dissertation 
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appears timely for scholars and practitioners in rethinking better and more effective 
environmental institutions as well as making a deliberate attempt to eventually solve 
environmental challenges. Moreover, the economic and environmental impact China 
brings along is non-negligible. Given that China has been the world’s largest economy by 
purchasing power parity from 2014 onwards, doing business with Chinese firms becomes 
unavoidable, lucrative, yet challenging in the age of globalization. Despite of the culture 
difference, considering that China actually is in a development stage in which it prioritizes 
economic development, whereas the western society has moved on from this stage and is 
now pursuing sustainable development, there will be a lot of differences in the mindsets, 
corporate practices, and ultimate goals between the two contexts when doing business 
together. This dissertation offers a careful investigation of two critical actors, the autocratic 
state and the dominant business group, in pushing environmentally sustainable economic 
development in China. The dissertation’s insights will help different relevant players, 
including government, business, and NGOs, in the world get a more comprehensive view 
of the current semi-institutionalized environmental institution in China.  
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Chapter 2. Government’s Green Grip: Multifaceted State Influence on Corporate 
Environmental Practices in China1
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Emerging economies such as China enjoy economic expansion but also face dramatic 
environmental challenges. China’s government is a central actor in both stimulating 
economic activities and pursuing environmental protection. Drawing on panel data and in-
depth interviews, we examined the influence of the state on environmental practices of 
Chinese publicly listed firms at different levels of administrative hierarchy. The results 
show that corporate environmental practices follow an inverted U-shape as control of 
environmental practices moves from the central government to the most decentral 
administrative level. This curvilinear relationship is positively moderated by regulatory 
stringency and negatively by state financial participation in the corporate ownership 
structure. We conclude that state influence on corporate environmental practices in China 
is multifaceted and subject to ‘policy-policy decoupling’. 
  
                                                             
1 This study is conducted in collaboration with Frank Wijen and Pursey Heugens. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The government is a key driver of corporate environmental practices (Delmas and Toffel, 
2004; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Marquis and Qian, 2014; Porter and Van der Linde, 
1995). Government instruments like regulation, pollution levies, and subsidies induce 
firms to develop and implement environmentally friendly policies (Kemp, Soete, and 
Weehuizen, 2012). The influence of government has been studied extensively in the 
context of Western societies (Bansal and Hoffman, 2012; Wijen, Zoeteman, Pieters, and 
Van Seters, 2012), but scholars have only to a limited extent investigated how the 
government affects environmental practices in emerging economies (Marquis and Raynard, 
2015). This is surprising, as the combination of high economic growth, shifts in global 
industrial production patterns, and important governance challenges (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, 
and Wright, 2000) has led to major environmental problems in many emerging economies 
(UNEP, 2012).  
The quintessential example is China. After decades of sustained growth, China 
became the world’s biggest economy in terms of purchasing power parity in 2014 (IMF, 
2015). China also became the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2006, and the 
leading consumer of (non-renewable) energy in 2009 (World Bank, 2015), even though the 
country made some progress in terms of resource efficiency and clean product 
development (Mol and Carter, 2006; Li and Shui, 2015). The growing magnitude of the 
environmental challenges facing emerging economies, therefore, calls for a better 
understanding of their environmental governance. 
While researchers have recognized the central role of the government in 
environmental governance, they have treated its influence on corporate environmental 
practices as monolithic, consisting of a clear and consistent set of expectations (e.g. 
Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Sharma and Henriques, 2005). However, the government exerts 
influence at different levels, from the central state to the village — the most decentral 
governmental organ. Previous studies have suggested that the Chinese government is a 
dominant actor with a complex organizational structure and multiple levels of 
administrative hierarchy, each of which may influence corporate behavior in different 
ways (Child et al., 2007; Carter and Mol, 2006; Luo et al., 2016). While the Chinese 
central state has acknowledged the existence of major environmental problems and has 
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served as the major driver of sustainable development, lower-level administrative branches 
have not always prioritized sustainable development to the same degree (Qi et al., 2008). 
As one Chinese proverb capturing the mindset of lower-tiered magistrates states, the 
emperor is as far away as the sky (tian gao huang di yuan, in Chinese). Local governments 
thus have their own development agendas for the firms they control, which need not be 
consistent with central governmental policies emphasizing environmental protection.  
We focus on the multifaceted impact of the government on corporate 
environmentalism. In the absence of objective performance measures, we seek to explain 
company-reported practices, thereby addressing two essential issues. First, we discuss how 
administrative hierarchical distance — the degree of power separation between the central 
government and the level of government holding the monitoring and control rights over a 
firm — affects environmental practices. We identify nine levels of administrative 
hierarchy in China, and assess their impact on corporate environmental practices. Second, 
we focus on regulatory stringency and state financial participation in firm ownership as 
contextual factors that may moderate the focal relationship. We thus unpack the 
multifaceted influence of the Chinese government, a seemingly unitary yet internally 
plexiform actor, on corporate environmental practices. China’s transitional market offers 
an excellent context for examining how a single constituent can exert multiple and 
sometimes contradictory influences on firms. As firms are both the source of and solution 
to environmental problems (Bansal and Hoffman, 2012), we study their corporate 
environmental practices, defined as the extent to which Chinese firms evidence “the 
recognition and integration of environmental concerns into a firm’s decision-making 
process” (Banerjee, 2002: 177). Our leading research questions are: (1) what is the 
influence of administrative hierarchical distance on corporate environmental practices in 
China; and (2) what government-related factors moderate this influence? 
Using content analysis and panel analysis on data collected on Chinese listed 
firms between 2008 and 2012, we theorized and found the relationship between 
administrative hierarchical distance and corporate environmental practices to follow an 
inverted U-shaped pattern. Two opposing forces produce this phenomenon. On the one 
hand, firms experience mounting pressure, meaning that environmental compliance 
pressures accumulate with administrative hierarchical distance. Due to China’s highly 
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centralized political system (Lin, 2011), we expect the pressures emanating from more 
central governmental levels to carry greater weight than those exerted at more decentral 
levels. On the other hand, we expect firms to experience increasing autonomy, as local 
governments in China tend to use their distance from the central government to prioritize 
economic development over environmental protection. Since the careers of lower-tiered 
magistrates in China are often determined by their track record for stimulating economic 
growth (Li and Zhou, 2005), we expect autonomy to prevail at local governmental levels. 
Moreover, we expect the contextual factors of regulatory stringency and state financial 
participation to moderate the balance between the two forces in different ways. Firms 
subject to more stringent regulation conduct more environmental practices at intermediate 
levels of administrative control, whereas state ownership reduces such activities at those 
levels. 
Our study makes two contributions. First, we add to the corporate 
environmentalism literature by disentangling the varied roles of different levels of 
government. Most prior studies have treated governments as unitary entities, assuming that 
they operate in consistent and concerted ways across hierarchical levels (Delmas and 
Toffel, 2008; Sharma and Henriques, 2005). Contrastingly, we show that governments 
have multiple faces, and that governmental bodies operating at different levels can exert 
alternate and even conflicting influences on corporate environmental practices. This may 
be true not only in emerging economies, but also in developed nations, especially in 
federal states with high levels of local autonomy, like Germany and the United States.  
Second, our empirical examination of environmental governance in an emerging 
economy adds new perspectives to the literature on corporate environmentalism. The 
existing body of work has privileged investigations of environmental governance in 
developed economies, in which civil society provides an important complementary ‘check’ 
on firms’ environmental behavior (Bansal and Hoffman, 2012; Wijen et al., 2012). 
Nonetheless, many contemporary nations facing important environmental challenges—
including China and Russia—are characterized by far greater involvement of the 
government in both corporate ownership and environmental custodianship. Since civil 
society is a much weaker force in these contexts (Earnhart et al., 2014), our existing 
insights into corporate environmentalism—built on democracy, stakeholder dialogue, and 
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the influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—are also less applicable. 
Shedding light on the influence of the government on environmental practices in an 
emerging economy like China furthers our understanding of the ways in which the world’s 
rapidly growing environmental challenges can be contained more effectively.  
2.2 Environmental Governance in China 
In the aftermath of its economic success, China faces important environmental challenges. 
The similar patterns displayed in the growth rates of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, 
energy consumption, and gross domestic product (GDP) in Figure 2.1 suggest that 
economic development in China has been inextricably linked to environmental degradation. 
Figure 2.1 Growth rates of CO2 emission, energy consumption, and GDP in China 
(World Bank, 2014) 
 
                 Growth rate of CO2 emissions in China 
Growth rate of energy consumption in China 
Growth rate of GDP in China 
 
In China, the largest autocratic country in the world, the state is the dominant 
actor in terms of advancing corporate environmentalism (Beeson, 2010; Marquis and Qian, 
2014). NGOs play a supporting role in this process (Ma and Ortolano, 2000), relieving 
pressure on the government by educating civil society on environmental issues (Spires, 
2011). The central government has become increasingly aware of its environmental 
challenges. For instance, the former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
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was officially promoted to the highest level of governance in the Chinese political 
structure, and became the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in 2008. Clear, 
obligatory environmental targets were set in the 11th Five-Year Plan in 2006, whereas the 
12th Five-Year Plan in 2011 tightened them further. As shown in Figure 2.2, almost one 
tenth of the central government’s 2012 annual report was focused on environmental 
protection, as compared to only one percent in 1985. 
Figure 2.2 Proportion of environment-related issues in Chinese annual government 
reports 
 (Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2014) 
 
In China, both local governments and the central state have the power to allocate 
significant resources to the development of industries and regions (Luo et al., 2016; 
Marquis and Qian, 2014). Policy enforcement differs across administrative hierarchical 
levels, however, as local governments have pursued development strategies that vary from 
those of the central government for historical reasons. After the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, priority was given to the development of heavy 
industry for economic reconstruction. The 1978 Open Door Policy, with its 
decentralization of revenue appropriation and investment allocation from the provincial 
governments down to individual enterprises, was conducive to the establishment of a 
market regime (Oi, 1995). When local governments began to be evaluated primarily in 
terms of GDP growth from 1985 onwards, environmental protection laws and regulations 
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effectively became dead letters. Local governments had “strong incentives to circumvent 
those policies adopted in Beijing that might constrain local growth” (Lieberthal, 1995: 
316). Profitable firms in heavy industry often enjoyed the protection of local governments 
(Marquis, Zhang, and Zhou, 2011). Differences in regional development policies between 
central and local governments quickly became apparent. As the Chinese saying goes, 
“local policies trump central governmental policies” (shang you zheng ce, xia you dui ce). 
When the central government later began to regulate environmental issues, local 
governments thus rarely followed in lockstep (Child et al., 2007).  
Irrespective of these differences, there is also consistency within the 
administrative system. The state categorically uses a variety of policy instruments, 
implemented through local ministerial branches, to achieve its environmental protection 
targets. The local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs, branches of the MEP) and the 
local Development and Reform Bureaus (DRBs, branches of the National Development 
and Reform Commission) use rules to enhance the environmental performance of local 
firms. They set targets for emission reduction and energy conservation, and apply 
administrative penalties. Local DRBs, together with the local Bureaus of Economy and 
Information Technology and with branches of the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology at the central level, also grant subsidies to local firms for clean production, 
energy saving, and emission reduction. In 2012, subsidies amounting to RMB 200 billion 
(about USD 32 billion) were allocated to energy saving and environmental protection 
purposes (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012). The EPBs also use environmental 
performance disclosure to create public reputational impact. Saving face (mian zi) is 
crucial for firms, as reputation is a major social currency in Chinese society (Park and Luo, 
2001). An overview of the Chinese environmental governance structure is presented in 
Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3 The Chinese environmental governance structure2
 
 
2.3 Government Influence on Corporate Environmental Practices 
Firms adopt environmental strategies to maintain legitimacy in light of compliance 
pressures from the government, local communities, and the market (Delmas and Toffel, 
2011; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999). Cited as the greatest source of pressure on firms 
(Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996), government influence manifests itself in a variety of 
ways (Kemp et al., 2012), including the enforcement of regulation (Russo, 1992; Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho, 2011) and signaling desired behaviors (Marquis and Qian, 2014). As 
firms seek to reduce uncertainty and advance private ends (Hillman et al., 2004), they must 
meet governmental expectations.  
The Chinese case offers an extraordinary opportunity to investigate how firms use 
corporate environmentalism as a political strategy, through which they respond to the 
multifaceted demands of the state (Marquis and Qian, 2014). Corporate political strategies 
                                                             
2 For the sake of simplicity, we do not distinguish between municipalities, districts, and towns that are at or under 
subprovincial municipality levels in Figure 2.3. 
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are complex in China, where grassroots movements without official supervision are 
restricted (Spires, 2011), the administrative hierarchy is rife with struggles (Carter and Mol, 
2006), and multiple policy instruments are used in conjunction but not always in concert 
(Shi and Zhang, 2006). We develop new arguments on how Chinese firms respond to 
multiplicitous government demands. 
2.3.1 Hierarchical government influence  
Two concurrent, opposing forces drive the cumulative impact of all administrative 
hierarchical layers on corporate environmental practices. We label the first mounting 
pressure. Firms feel pressed to increasingly engage in environmental practices as 
administrative hierarchical distance rises, although additional pressure will accumulate at a 
diminishing rate. As distance from the central government grows, a larger number of 
governmental bodies at different hierarchical levels are simultaneously involved in firm 
supervision (Xu, Tihanyi, and Hitt, 2014). Firms that are controlled directly by the central 
government only face a singular set of compliance pressures, leading to fewer constraints 
on corporate behavior (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). Many firms in China, however, are 
controlled by local governments, which serve as delegates (Qi et al., 2008) or agents 
(Wong, 2000) of their superior authorities. The central government delegates power and 
responsibilities to the provincial governments, requiring the latter to implement centrally 
formulated targets and plans in all policy areas, including environmental management. 
Seen from the perspective of firms controlled directly by the provinces, however, 
provincial governments add a layer of environmental compliance pressure, cumulating on 
top of the central government’s dictums (Marquis and Qian, 2014; Luo et al., 2016). These 
pressures keep mounting with additional administrative hierarchical distance, as provincial 
governments, in their turn, delegate power to municipal governments, and so on. 
Delegating governmental bodies retain the right to intervene in lower-order affairs and 
continue to regulate the relevant larger policy areas. Compliance pressures cumulate at a 
decreasing rate, however, because in China’s centralized political system (Lin, 2011), 
higher-level agencies are primarily rule makers and lower-level bodies are mostly rule 
takers. Since governmental bodies at very decentral levels hardly add any environmental 
regulation of their own, the mounting pressure effect eventually levels off. 
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The second, opposing force we identify is increasing autonomy, which captures 
the effect that local governments tend to wield their discretionary power to prioritize 
economic growth over environmental conservation. With increasing administrative 
hierarchical distance, the central government becomes less able to oversee the extent to 
which local governments enforce its intentions rigorously. Governmental pressure to 
conduct environmental practices will thus be lower for firms operating at greater 
administrative hierarchical distance from the central government, also because the 
governmental agencies controlling them acquire more autonomy themselves (Qi et al., 
2008). Centrally developed environmental regulations are often intentionally crafted in 
ambiguous terms to offer discretion to local governments, and the latter use this power 
pragmatically (Ma and Ortolano, 2000). When lower-level governments control firms, 
environmental policy instruments tend to be implemented only partially to favor local 
employment, boost fiscal revenues, and advance lower-tiered magistrates’ careers, which 
heavily rely on economic performance (Morduch and Sicular, 2000; Qi et al., 2008; Zheng, 
Singh, and Mitchell, 2015). When profitable firms display environmentally disruptive 
behavior, local governments often avoid taking measures that would lead to environmental 
compliance at the expense of tax revenues (Morduch and Sicular, 2002; Shi and Zhang, 
2006). The increasing autonomy effect continues to augment with administrative 
hierarchical distance, because decentrally controlled firms enjoy greater bargaining power 
vis-à-vis local governments. The latter depend on income from local businesses (Ma and 
Ortolano, 2000) and are therefore susceptible to firms threatening to shift their activities to 
localities with more lenient environmental regimes (Kalamova and Johnstone, 2012). This 
allows firms to co-opt officials (Zheng et al., 2015) and circumvent environmental 
regulations (Child and Tsai, 2005).  
While the mounting pressure effect increases yet levels off, firms’ autonomy vis-
à-vis local governments thus keeps growing. We therefore expect that these two forces will 
jointly produce an inverted U-shaped relationship (Haans, Pieters, and He, 2016) between 
administrative hierarchical distance and corporate environmental practices. Figure 2.4 plots 
this combined effect. The first part of the curve is dominated by the mounting pressure 
effect, inducing firms to increasingly conduct environmental practices. At higher levels of 
administrative hierarchical distance, however, the cumulative pressure levels off and is 
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overtaken by the increasing autonomy effect, resulting in decreasing environmental 
practices pressure. See Hypothesis 2.1. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Administrative hierarchical distance has an inverted U-shaped 
effect on corporate environmental practices. 
Figure 2.4 Combined effect of hierarchical distance and environmental practices 
 
2.3.2 Moderating effects on hierarchical influence 
To further probe into the influence of the state, we explore how several government-related 
factors moderate the impact of administrative hierarchical distance on corporate 
environmental practices. Drawing on insights from corporate political strategies (Hillman 
et al., 2004) and corporate environmentalism (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2011; Marquis 
and Qian, 2014), we argue that the focal relationship is likely to be moderated by two 
contextual factors: regulatory stringency and the state’s financial participation in the 
ownership structure of the focal firm.  
Regulatory stringency 
 Governments frequently rely on regulation to promote, facilitate, or enforce 
environmentally benign corporate behavior (Kemp et al., 2012). We expect that both the 
mounting pressure and increasing autonomy effects associated with environmental 
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practices will intensify with regulatory stringency, resulting in a steepened inverted U-
shaped relationship (cf. Jourdan and Kivleniece, 2016). Regulation intensifies the 
mounting pressure effect, as governments use regulation to control inputs (e.g. banning 
toxic substances), production (e.g. requiring cleaner production technologies), and outputs 
(e.g. establishing bounds on pollution levels). Certain sectors are more stringently 
regulated than others, because their activities are perceived to be more environmentally 
disruptive (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001; Fiorino, 1996). Firms facing more stringent 
environmental regulations suffer from a lack of legitimacy, as they are considered to 
adversely affect the natural environment. They therefore tend to engage proactively in 
environmental practices (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; cf. Marquis and Qian, 2014). With the 
central government becoming increasingly aware of the severity of environmental issues 
(Child et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2016), it has allocated more resources to the monitoring of 
the environmental compliance of more disruptive sectors and it has urged local 
governments to enforce environmental regulations more tightly (Lo and Tang, 2006; Shi 
and Zhang, 2006). Consequently, firms in stringently regulated sectors experience greater 
pressure to carry out their environmental actions. As a political strategy, environmental 
practices are instrumental for firms in environmentally disruptive sectors, as they signal 
their compliance with stringent requirements and help them acquire, retain, or regain their 
legitimacy (Banerjee, 2002; Marquis and Qian, 2014; Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). 
We similarly expect the increasing autonomy effect to be amplified in more 
regulated sectors. Traditional sectors have majorly contributed to the Chinese economy’s 
sustained growth (Li and Leung, 2012). Industries like basic metals, chemicals, coal, and 
consumer goods have generated employment, income, and tax revenues. Since China’s 
fiscal and investment policies were decentralized (Oi, 1995), local governments have been 
the primary beneficiaries of this economic expansion (Morduch and Sicular, 2000; Qi et al., 
2008; Zheng et al., 2015). Given their higher level of vested interests in traditional sectors, 
lower-tiered magistrates will make every effort to protect these activities. While these 
sectors are environmentally demanding, high economic stakes make local governments 
relatively lenient when it comes to issuing and implementing environmental regulations—
also to avoid firms relocating towards more lenient regions (Kalamova and Johnstone, 
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2012). In total, the opposing effects of mounting pressure and increased autonomy are both 
magnified in highly regulated sectors. See Hypothesis 2.2.  
Hypothesis 2.2: The inverted U-shaped relationship between administrative 
hierarchical distance and corporate environmental practices is steepened by 
regulatory stringency. 
 
State financial participation 
We expect the state’s financial participation in the ownership structure of firms to attenuate 
the focal relationship. As an insider, the state will mitigate the mounting pressure effect 
due to the presence of mixed motives. When the government is more involved in the 
immediate environment of a corporation, corporate strategies are more likely to be 
influenced by the quest for political legitimacy (Marquis and Qian, 2014). Bureaucratic 
embeddedness not only facilitates corporate access to critical information and resources 
such as capital, business licenses, and information (Li and Zhang, 2007; Lu and Yao, 
2006), but also enhances government control over the implementation of environmental 
policies (Dickson, 2003; Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003). At the same time, the state also 
expects to extract dividends from the firms in which it has invested. It will therefore be 
reluctant to stringently implement environmental policies that might adversely affect the 
profitability of state-owned firms. In combination, these two conflicting motives produce 
mitigated environmental policy enforcement.  
State financial participation also attenuates the increasing autonomy effect. 
Whereas the career prospects of lower-tiered magistrates used to depend solely on their 
ability to realize economic growth, environmental performance has recently become part 
of the criteria by which they are evaluated, due to the increased attention the Chinese 
central government is paying to environmental degradation (Marquis and Qian, 2014). 
Magistrates with corporate connections, such as those representing governmental bodies 
investing in firms, are publicly scrutinized over corporate social and environmental 
performance (Piotroski, Wong, and Zhang, 2015). Civil servants charged with controlling 
state-owned firms are also personally liable for severe environmental accidents 
(Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China, 2014: article 63), 
making them less tolerant of corporate non-compliance. The additional scrutiny of lower-
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tiered magistrates involved with firms in which the state participates financially thus 
ensues a weakened increasing autonomy effect. In combination, these weaker mounting 
pressure and increasing autonomy effects attenuate the focal relationship. See Hypothesis 
2.3.  
Hypothesis 2.3: The inverted U-shaped relationship between administrative 
hierarchical distance and corporate environmental practices is attenuated by state 
financial participation. 
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Sample and data 
We chose China as our research setting for three reasons. First, the country is highly 
dependent on (heavy) industrial production, meaning that it will have to address difficult 
environmental challenges while working on its economic development. Unlike Western 
countries, China cannot postpone dealing with environmental issues until its 
industrialization process is completed (Cole and Neumayer, 2005). Second, the power of 
the state is pervasive in China, as it permeates nearly all economic, political, and cultural 
institutions (Child et al., 2007). Third, China is a transitioning economy. The structural 
transformations of most sectors in the past few decades have profoundly impacted 
industrial dynamics and corporate behavior (Luo, 2003).  
To test our hypotheses, we developed a longitudinal dataset on Chinese listed 
firms covering the period between 2008 and 2012. The year 2008 marks a turning point for 
the Chinese political system in terms of environmental protection, as the former SEPA was 
transformed into the MEP. This promotion to ministerial agency entitled the MEP to draft 
laws and make top decisions for the country, which gave a major impetus to the planned 
restructuring of key sectors such as iron and steel, petrochemicals, textiles, nonferrous 
metals, and equipment manufacturing. Furthermore, the development of Strategic 
Emerging Industries, many of which were involved with environmentally friendly 
technologies, became a national strategic priority in 2008 (Report on the Work of the 
Government, 2010). Moreover, under the supervision of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and the Shanghai Stock 
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Exchange (SSE) issued notices and guidelines on corporate social responsibility and 
environmental information disclosure for listed firms in the years 2006 and 2008, 
respectively, which made corporate environmental reports much more detailed from 2008 
onwards. 
We compiled our sample from the 1425 firms listed on the Main Boards of both 
SSE and SZSE for the following reasons. First, as listed firms are larger than their non-
listed counterparts, they have a greater impact on the economy and the natural environment, 
thus attracting more governmental scrutiny (Edelman, 1992). Second, being exposed to 
society at large, listed firms have to respond to institutional pressures if they are to 
maintain their societal license to operate. Third, because the SSE only has a Main Board, 
whereas the SZSE also has two other boards (Growth Enterprises Market and Small and 
Medium Enterprises Boards), we selected Main Board firms to ensure comparability. We 
excluded firms that received a ‘Special Treatment’ (ST) tag from the stock exchanges, 
which is given in response to irregularities such as reporting financial losses for two 
consecutive years, or failing to provide an audit report from a certified accounting firm 
(China Stock Market Handbook, 2008). We did this because ST firms face various trading 
and financial restrictions (such as suspension of trading, losing their right to issue new 
shares, and even getting delisted; Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011) that may incentivize them to 
manipulate their reports to come out of the designation (Firth, Rui, and Wu, 2011; Jiang 
and Wang, 2008).  
To ensure that our sample covered all relevant sectors of firms listed on Chinese 
stock exchanges, we identified three groups. First, firms manufacturing products that 
protect the natural environment and/or save energy. Second, firms employing 
environmentally demanding core technologies or being listed as major polluters. Third, 
firms that do not belong to either of the aforementioned sectors. To identify the sectors 
included in the first group, we used the CNI TEDA Environmental Protection Index issued 
in 2008. These sectors comprise sewage disposal, emission reduction equipment, energy 
saving equipment and material, and recycling and renewable energy (wind, hydro, and 
biomass). This first group consisted of 36 listed firms in total. Due to the intensive nature 
of our data collection strategy, we used random sampling to select firms in the other two 
groups (Feldman, Amit, and Villalonga, 2016; Philippe and Durand, 2011). We identified 
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the sectors included in the second group using the Directory of Industrial Classifications 
for Listed Firms Subject to Environmental Protection Inspections, issued by the MEP in 
2008. These sectors consisted of thermal power, iron and steel, cement, electrolyzed 
aluminum, coal, metallurgy, construction materials, mining, chemicals, petrifaction, 
pharmaceuticals, light industry, textiles, and leather goods. This second group consisted of 
388 listed firms in total, which we reduced to 36 (equivalent amount to the first group) 
using systematic sampling, a random sampling technique that uses a constant interval, k, 
on a criterion variable to compile a sample (Bellhouse, 1988). In our case, we set k at 
388/36 ≈10.78 and rank -ordered the group-2 firms in terms of annual turnover. Starting 
with the 11th-ranked firm, we collected our remaining observations by selecting firms at 
the next integer position rounded up from 2k, 3k, and so forth. We used the same sampling 
criterion to select 36 firms for group 3, which spanned sectors like information technology, 
financial institutions, and media companies.  
We dropped observations in case firm-level strategic restructuring decisions 
caused major changes in a firm’s product portfolio, resulting in firms initially included in 
one group migrating to one of the two others. This winnowing procedure reduced our final 
sample size to 480 firm-year observations involving 107 unique firms (group 1: 151 firm-
year observations, 36 firms; group 2: 159 firm-year observations, 35 firms; group 3: 170 
firm-year observations, 36 firms). 
2.4.2 Variables and measures 
Dependent variable  
Corporate environmental practices. We measured corporate environmental practices by 
exploring detailed descriptions of actual corporate environmental actions. Eligible actions 
include specific efforts to save energy and decrease pollution, as well as activities aimed at 
propagating environmental protection concepts. We conducted a content analysis of firms’ 
annual financial reports and corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports (sometimes also 
called ‘sustainability reports’ or ‘environmental responsibility reports’), as obtained from 
CNINFO and firms’ official websites. The annual reports are consistent and standardized 
among all listed firms. SZSE and SSE both issued guidance for listed firms to refer to 
when reporting their CSR performance, environmental performance included, covering 
specific types of issues that should be addressed. The triangulation of annual and CSR 
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reports has a number of advantages in terms of identifying corporate environmental actions. 
First, annual reports are widely acknowledged as the major channel through which firms 
disclose important information (Wiseman, 1982; Sharma and Henriques, 2005). Second, 
annual reports may provide a more accurate picture of environmental activities than data 
obtained from surveys (Bansal, 2005), especially because these official statements are 
subject to third-party verification. Third, we included CSR reports as they disclose more 
fine-grained environmentally relevant information than financial reports. 
Illustrative sentences include: “our firm reduced X tons of sulfide in the past 
year”; “we organized environmental protection activities Y times in our district” and “Z 
RMB were spent to reduce emissions and energy consumption”. To avoid the inclusion of 
greenwashing instances in our analysis, we only included substantively specified actions 
into our counts of corporate environmental practices. The variable was coded in several 
steps, using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 10. First, we engaged in an open 
coding process by reading through ten randomly selected annual reports issued by firms in 
our sample, noting the environmental issues firms focused on. Second, we labeled the 
aspects identified in the first step. Additional labels were added during the coding process, 
when new aspects were found in other firms. Third, we calculated the total number of 
words covered by each label. To correct for the fact that some firms’ reports are wordier 
than others, we calculated the percentage of words related to corporate environmentalism 
out of the total words in the relevant annual financial reports and CSR reports. To reduce 
heteroskedasticity, we log-transformed the variable. Table 2.1 presents the list of final 
labels used to assess corporate environmental practices. 
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Table 2.1 Labels used to measure corporate environmental practices in Chinese listed 
firms 
Corporate environmental practices 
1. Corporate focus on environmental protection 
1.1 Alternative resources or power, healthy materials 
1.2 Actual emission amount or emission reduction amount 
1.3 Actual energy consumption amount or energy saving amount 
1.4 Contribution to the community as to environmental issues 
1.5 Environmental protection project tracking 
1.6 Energy saving and emission reduction amount (ESER) 
1.7 Execution of the environmental protection system 
1.8 Expenditures on environmental performance 
1.9 Meeting certain environmental standards or regulations 
1.10 Participation in events, organizing one-off or routine events for 
popularizing ESER 
1.11 Paperless office 
1.12 Recycling 
1.13 Relevant equipment used for ESER 
1.14 Requirements for corporate actors as to environmental issues 
1.15 Welcoming supervision from the community 
1.16 Waste disposal amount 
2. Requirements vis-à-vis business partners 
2.1 Green supply chain 
2.2 Green distribution and/or transportation 
2.3 Green after-sales service 
 
Independent variables 
Administrative hierarchical distance. To test Hypothesis 2.1, we calculated the 
administrative hierarchical distance from the firm to the central government. It reflects the 
number of governmental levels separating the central government from the level of 
government that holds the monitoring and/or control rights of a given firm, and thus is 
responsible for implementing environmental policy for that specific firm. This variable 
was computed differently for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than for non-SOEs, because 
SOEs in China have a political status comparable to governmental organs. A firm located 
in a town might be governed directly by the State Council, making it difficult for the local 
government to exert influence over its activities. Lower-level governmental bodies thus 
can hardly influence firms with a higher political status. We therefore calculated the 
administrative hierarchical distance for SOEs as the number of tiers separating the 
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controlling governmental organ (the ultimate owner) and the central government. As non-
SOEs do not have political status, we computed their score on the administrative 
hierarchical distance variable by adding an additional tier to the distance score of the 
nearest and lowest governmental jurisdiction in which they were embedded (i.e., the 
ultimate monitor) to capture their subordinate status. Larger values on this variable thus 
represent greater administrative hierarchical distance. For SOEs, ultimate owner data was 
obtained from annual reports. For non-SOEs, the relevant jurisdiction was taken from the 
annual report, which specifies the corporate working address and the governmental body 
responsible for monitoring the firm. The distance variable was calculated according to the 
scale captured in Table 2.2. In Appendix 1, we provide two examples of how this measure 
was computed for SOEs and non-SOEs.  
Table 2.2 Hierarchical distance to the central government 
 SOE Non-SOEa 
Village 5 6 
Town 4 5 
Town under subprovincial municipality 3.5 4.5 
District/county 3 4 
District/county under subprovincial municipality 2.5 3.5 
Municipality 2 3c 
Subprovincial municipalityb 1.5  
Province 1  
Central state 0  
aThe value of hierarchical distance is one unit more in non-SOEs than in SOEs 
because there is also one unit of distance from a firm to its nearest local government for 
non-SOEs. 
bSubprovincial municipalities are those cities that are designated to be at the same 
level as a province when economic development and social development are prioritized by 
the central government. 
cPrivate firms are not directly owned by municipalities, provinces or the central 
state. Therefore, they are under the control of all levels, the highest of which is the 
region/county in a municipality. Such a region or county has an equivalence level with 
municipality. This is why the distance of non-SOEs starts at value 3. 
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Regulatory stringency.  To test Hypothesis 2.2, we calculated the percentage of 
waste gas emission reduction over the past five years by industry to indicate the level of 
regulatory stringency faced by a firm. We opted for emission reductions, as prior studies 
have found this variable to be a useful and sector-specific proxy for regulatory stringency 
(Brunel and Levinson, 2016; Javorcik and Wei, 2004). We opted for waste gas emissions 
in particular, because these are the main target of environmental regulation in China, given 
the high degree of air pollution (Zhang, He, and Huo, 2012). Sectorial emission data was 
collected from the Environmental Statistics Dataset disclosed annually by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China on its official website. The variable was 
log-transformed. 
State financial participation. To test Hypothesis 2.3, we calculated the percentage 
of shares held by state legal persons in a listed firm. These legal persons not only include 
the state itself, but also other institutions and state-owned firms. The variable was retrieved 
and calculated from the table specifying “the ten largest shareholders” that is mandatorily 
provided in firms’ annual reports and was log-transformed. 
Control variables 
Environmental subsidies. We calculated the log-transformed ratio of governmental 
environmental subsidies received divided by the firm’s revenues in a focal year. The 
variable was retrieved and calculated from the table specifying “details for subsidies from 
the government”, which is mandatorily provided in firms’ annual reports. 
Environmental malpractice disclosure. We counted the number of times a firm 
was disclosed by the EPBs or MEP to have violated environmental regulations. We 
collected the data from the website of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs 
(IPE), an environmental NGO that collects and discloses governmental environmental 
penalty reports.  
Political connections. We used two variables to control for the effect of political 
connections on the environmental practices of a listed firm. First, we log-transformed the 
percentage of top management team (TMT) members of the focal firm who also work for a 
governmental organ or who are members of the National People Congress (NPC) or the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to create the variable TMT 
political connections. Second, if the CEO/chair of the firm also works for a governmental 
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organ, or is a member of the NPC/CPPCC (Marquis and Qian, 2014), the dummy variable 
CEO political connections equals 1, and 0 otherwise. The two variables were collected 
from the TMT profiles that are mandatorily provided in the annual reports of listed firms.  
Local government fiscal power. Total provincial government revenue, obtained 
from the National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, was used to 
measure the fiscal power of the local government. The variable was log-transformed.  
Provincial GDP per capita. The data for this variable was annually derived from 
the China Statistical Yearbook, and was log-transformed. 
State ownership. When a firm was specified to be state-owned in the mandatory 
figure detailing ultimate ownership in its annual report, the value for this variable is 1, and 
0 otherwise. 
Firm size. We used annual turnover to measure firm size. The variable was 
collected from the CSMAR dataset, and was log-transformed. 
Export percentage. We used the amount of revenues a firm obtains from exports 
as a percentage of total sales to capture its dependence on international markets. The 
variable was collected from the firms’ annual reports and was log-transformed. 
Years in the field. To capture experience effects, we computed the number of 
years a firm had been operative in its current field. This variable was manually collected 
from firms’ annual reports and official websites. 
Free float percentage. We used the measurement specified by CSINDEX (2010) 
to calculate the free float percentage (i.e., the share of freely tradable equity) to capture 
capital market influences. Two types of shares were excluded from the free float due to 
their restricted trading status: initial public offering shares that are in the official lock-up 
period, and shares falling under the Equity Division Reform regime which restricts trade in 
substantial blocks of recently privatized SOE shares to prevent market shocks. The 
variable was collected from annual reports and log-transformed. 
Environmental quality. We took the average concentration of particulate matter 
10 pollutants (i.e., noxious solid or liquid particles with a diameter of 10 micrometers or 
less) in the air of the capital city of the province in which a firm is headquartered to 
measure regional environmental quality. The data was annually derived from the China 
Statistical Yearbook, and was log-transformed.  
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CSR report. We used a dummy variable to capture this effect, assigning a value of 
1 when a firm issued a CSR and/or environmental report, and 0 if not. When such a report 
was integrated into the annual report, we also assigned a value of 1. But when the financial 
report only contained CSR or environmental paragraphs, we attributed a value of 0.  
2.4.3 Regression method 
We analyzed our panel data using Stata 14.1. Since the main boards of SZSE and SSE only 
contain 36 group-1 firms, creating panel data enhances the size and richness of the dataset. 
We used random effects models because we analyzed several variables that describe the 
intrinsic, time-invariant properties of firms or industries, such as administrative 
hierarchical distance or the sector to which a firm belongs. Using a fixed effects model 
would eliminate these time-invariant effects, as the impact of variables with a constant 
value over time would be eliminated by the fixed effects transformation (Wooldridge, 
2008). The Hausman (1978) specification test confirmed that a random effects model was 
more appropriate than a fixed effects model (p = 0.64). The Breusch and Pagan (1979) 
Lagrangian multiplier test confirmed that a random effects model yields better results than 
a pooled regression model (p = 0.00).  
2.4.4 Supplementary interviews 
To triangulate our quantitative data and to facilitate the interpretation of our statistical 
results, we conducted 56 in-depth interviews, amounting to over 60 hours of conversations, 
with key informants in 2013 and 20143
                                                             
3 See Appendix 2 for the respondents’ profiles and places of the interviews. 
. Interviewees included representatives of 15 major 
Chinese firms, 3 different levels of government, and 2 environmental NGOs. Interview 
locations ranged from the Eastern coastal cities to the Western inland cities in Mainland 
China. Interviews were conducted on the premises of the interviewees’ organizations and 
lasted between 45 minutes and 2.5 hours, with a median of approximately one hour. All 
but one of the interviews were recorded and transcribed in Mandarin. We then read the 
transcripts, retrieved excerpts relevant to our three hypotheses, translated them into 
English, and added examples to our description of the results.  
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2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Statistical results 
Hypothesized results 
Table 2.3 reports descriptive statistics and correlations. Table 2.4 presents our regression 
results. Model 1 contains control variables. Model 2 adds the linear and squared terms of 
the administrative hierarchical distance variable (pertinent to Hypothesis 1). Models 3 and 
4 contain separate regressions involving the interactions of regulatory stringency and state 
financial participation with administrative hierarchical distance and its square term 
(relevant to Hypotheses 2 and 3). Model 5 contains the full model. Year effects are 
included in all models. 
As shown in Model 2, Hypothesis 2.1 was supported. We found an inverted U-
shaped effect of administrative hierarchical distance on environmental practices. Mounting 
pressure due to the involvement of multiple governmental bodies initially leads to more 
extensive practices. However, this accumulation effect is eventually outweighed by the 
increasing autonomy mechanism, resulting in reduced enforcement of centrally developed 
environmental policies by lower-tiered local governments. The coefficient for the linear 
term is positive and significant (b = 0.10, s.e. = 0.04, p = 0.02), whereas for the squared 
term it is negative and significant (b = -0.02, s.e. = 0.01, p = 0.03), implying an inverted 
U-shape. The turning point of the curvilinear relationship is situated at an administrative 
hierarchical distance value of 2.5 (i.e., -0.10 divided by 2*(-0.02)). Table 2.2 shows what 
this means: firms — both SOEs and non-SOEs — controlled by governmental bodies 
below the district/county level engage less in environmental practices as the hierarchical 
distance between the central government and the controlling body increases. In contrast, 
firms that are supervised by governmental bodies above the district/county level become 
increasingly responsive to the central government’s environmental policies as the distance 
from their controlling organs to the central state increases. 
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 Table 2.3 D
escriptive statistics and correlations 
V
ariables 
M
ean 
s.d. 
M
in. 
M
ax. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1. E
nvironm
ental practices * 
0.20 
0.27 
0.00 
1.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. D
istance to central 
2.00 
1.56 
0.00 
5.00 
-0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. State financial participation
* 
2.91 
1.54 
0.00 
4.44 
0.13 
-0.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. R
egulatory stringency
* 
0.22 
0.71 
-3.88 
4.97 
-0.02 
-0.04 
0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Subsidy * 
0.11 
0.32 
0.00 
2.22 
0.11 
0.04 
-0.05 
0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
6. M
alpractice 
0.68 
2.25 
0.00 
31.00 
0.14 
-0.12 
0.06 
0.02 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
7. T
M
T political connections * 
2.16 
1.22 
0.00 
4.04 
-0.05 
-0.24 
0.23 
-0.01 
-0.02 
0.10 
 
 
 
8. C
E
O
 political connections 
0.42 
0.49 
0.00 
1.00 
0.04 
-0.11 
0.07 
-0.04 
0.10 
0.16 
0.58 
 
 
9. Fiscal pow
er * 
7.54 
0.80 
3.25 
8.74 
-0.02 
0.08 
-0.11 
-0.04 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
0.08 
 
10. G
D
P/capita * 
12.91 
0.49 
11.74 
13.72 
-0.04 
0.02 
-0.06 
0.01 
0.04 
0.05 
-0.02 
0.01 
0.65 
11. State-O
w
ned 
0.69 
0.46 
0.00 
1.00 
0.15 
-0.81 
0.81 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.09 
0.13 
0.04 
-0.04 
12. Firm
 size * 
7.85 
1.58 
2.83 
14.85 
0.25 
-0.33 
0.14 
-0.03 
0.05 
0.28 
0.17 
0.20 
0.24 
13. E
xport percentage * 
1.02 
1.38 
0.00 
4.47 
-0.10 
0.22 
-0.18 
-0.04 
0.06 
-0.12 
-0.29 
-0.25 
0.08 
14. Y
ears in the field 
21.92 
18.12 
0.00 
109.00 
0.21 
-0.13 
0.06 
0.01 
-0.09 
0.04 
0.04 
0.08 
0.06 
15. Free float percentage * 
3.89 
0.35 
2.44 
4.54 
-0.04 
0.18 
-0.14 
0.07 
-0.13 
-0.13 
-0.12 
-0.11 
-0.05 
16. E
nvironm
ental quality * 
-2.39 
0.22 
-3.22 
-1.90 
0.00 
-0.18 
0.06 
0.01 
0.11 
0.12 
0.09 
-0.01 
0.02 
17. C
SR
 report 
0.43 
0.49 
0.00 
1.00 
0.52 
-0.10 
0.10 
-0.04 
0.12 
0.13 
-0.09 
0.07 
0.06 
 
 
 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
11. State ow
nership 
 
-0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Firm
 size * 
 
0.26 
0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
13. E
xport percentage * 
 
0.02 
-0.14 
-0.04 
 
 
 
 
14. Y
ears in the field 
 
-0.04 
0.15 
0.19 
0.11 
 
 
 
15. Free float percentage * 
 
-0.20 
-0.11 
-0.33 
0.15 
0.06 
 
 
16. E
nvironm
ental quality * 
 
0.01 
0.13 
0.35 
0.01 
0.02 
-0.16 
 
17. C
SR
 report 
 
0.14 
0.07 
0.32 
-0.01 
0.10 
-0.04 
-0.08 
 N
 = 480. C
orrelations w
ith an absolute value greater than 0.09 are significant at p < 0.05. * Log transform
ed. 
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Table 2.4 Random effects regression for corporate environmental practices 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Distance to central  0.10 0.08 0.38 0.37 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.12) 
Distance to central square  -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Regulatory stringency   -0.05  -0.05 
   (0.02)  (0.02) 
Regulatory stringency * distance   0.05  0.05 
   (0.02)  (0.02) 
Regulatory stringency * distance square   -0.01  -0.01 
   (0.00)  (0.00) 
State financial participation    0.07 0.07 
    (0.04) (0.05) 
State financial participation * distance    -0.09 -0.09 
    (0.03) (0.04) 
State financial participation * distance square    0.02 0.02 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Environmental subsidies 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Malpractice disclosure -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TMT political connections -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO political connections -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Fiscal power 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP per capita -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
State ownership 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.19 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) 
Firm size 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Export percentage -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years in the field 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Free float percentage 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Environmental quality 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
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Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CSR report 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.25 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.80 0.73 
 (0.61) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.65) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald Chi square 110.66 118.12 123.01 128.76 132.48 
Number of observations = 480, number of firms = 107. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Hypothesis 2.2 was supported, as shown by the consistent results of the 
interaction of regulatory stringency and the administrative hierarchical distance variables 
in Models 3 and 5. The latter shows that the coefficient of the interaction between 
regulatory stringency and the squared term of administrative hierarchical distance was 
negative and significant (b = -0.01, s.e. = 0.00, p = 0.05), suggesting a steepening of the 
effect (Haans et al., 2016). Figure 2.5 (a) shows how low, medium, and high degrees of 
regulatory stringency moderated the distance-practices relationship (Dawson, 2014). 
Figure 2.5 (a) illustrates that firms in sectors that are subject to stringent regulations 
experienced a steeper inverted U-shaped effect between administrative hierarchical 
distance and corporate environmental practices. At the apex of the curve, the effect of 
administrative hierarchical distance on environmental practices increased by about 30 
percent (1.1 vs. 1.4) from firms in relatively lowly to highly regulated sectors.  
Models 4 and 5 showed partial support for Hypothesis 2.3. The coefficient for the 
interaction between the quadratic term of administrative hierarchical distance and state 
financial participation was positive and significant (b = 0.02, s.e. = 0.01, p = 0.01). This 
means that the inverted U-shaped relationship attenuated when the state participated to a 
greater extent in the ownership structure of the focal firms, supporting the idea that state 
financial participation negatively moderates the inverted U-shaped effect (Haans et al., 
2016).  
Figure 2.5 (b) shows how the degrees of state financial participation affected the 
main relation. As hypothesized, the inverted U-shaped curve first became flatter with 
higher state financial participation, for values in the low to medium (mean) range of 
participation. However, upon reaching a higher level of state financial participation, the 
curve experienced a shape flip. From Model 5, we calculated that the shape flip occurred 
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when state financial participation amounted to 3 (i.e., -(-0.06)/0.02; Haans et al., 2016). As 
the variable of state financial participation was log-transformed, its natural value is 0.19. 
Thus, the inverted-U shaped curve became flatter as state financial participation increased, 
and the curve flipped when states held more than 19 percent of a firm’s shares. At this 
value, the distance-practices relationship became linear, as the location of the inflection 
point approached infinity. Below and above this value, the curve took on opposing shapes 
(Haans et al., 2016). While our results are thus consistent with Hypothesis 2.3 for firms 
with state ownership in the 0–19 percent range, the hypothesis does not hold for firms with 
very high state financial participation.  
Figure 2.5 Moderating effects of (a) regulatory stringency and (b) state financial 
participation4
(a)   
 
(b)    
  
                                                             
4 The low, medium, and high values of the moderators were identified according to the min., mean, and max. 
values of the variables respectively. 
Environmental practices 
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Robustness checks 
Robustness checks are reported in Table 2.5. In Models 1 and 2, we merged the firms 
under the control of any subprovincial municipality, district under subprovincial 
municipality, and town under subprovincial municipality with their subordinate levels (i.e., 
municipality, district, and town, respectively). In Models 3–5, we calculated the percentage 
of waste gas, water, and solid emission reductions over the past five years by region as 
alternatives to waste gas emissions when measuring regulatory stringency by sector 
(Brunel and Levinson, 2016). In Model 6 we replaced the state financial participation 
variable with another variable capturing the state’s financial involvement: governmental 
environmental subsidies received divided by firm revenues. Most of the ensuing results 
and significance levels proved robust. One exception involved the results reported in 
Model 6. When using environmental subsidies as an alternative measure of state financial 
participation, the flattening effect still held at the same significance level, but we did not 
observe a flip of the inverted U-shape. Moreover, the effect for regulatory stringency 
became insignificant when we used solid waste reductions as a proxy variable. This is a 
plausible outcome, because our qualitative evidence suggested that solid waste lacked an 
effective monitoring system in China and had received very limited attention from both the 
government and civil society. 
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 Table 2.5 (C
ontinued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
ariables 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
R
egulatory stringency (region, solid w
aste) * distance square 
 
 
 
 
-0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.03) 
 
E
nvironm
ental subsidies * distance 
 
 
 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.07) 
E
nvironm
ental subsidies * distance square 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.01) 
R
egulatory stringency (region, w
aste gas) 
 
 
-0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
R
egulatory stringency (region, w
aste w
ater) 
 
 
 
-0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
 
 
R
egulatory stringency (region, solid w
aste) 
 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.08) 
 
E
nvironm
ental subsidies 
0.14 
0.13 
0.10 
0.12 
0.14 
0.01 
 
(0.04) 
(0.04) 
(0.04) 
(0.04) 
(0.04) 
(0.07) 
M
alpractice disclosure 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.00 
-0.00 
 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
T
M
T
 political connections 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.02 
 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
C
E
O
 political connections 
-0.01 
-0.00 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
-0.01 
 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
Fiscal pow
er 
0.01 
0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.04) 
(0.05) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
G
D
P per capita 
-0.09 
-0.09 
-0.07 
-0.06 
-0.09 
-0.07 
 
(0.05) 
(0.05) 
(0.05) 
(0.07) 
(0.05) 
(0.05) 
State ow
nership 
0.03 
0.19 
0.07 
0.08 
0.03 
0.04 
 
(0.07) 
(0.10) 
(0.07) 
(0.08) 
(0.07) 
(0.07) 
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2.5.2 Qualitative evidence 
General overview. Our interview data added further insights into our hypothesized 
relationships. Corporate interviewees recognized the crucial role the Chinese government 
played in enabling and constraining their business activities. Several interviewees 
remarked: “You need to get approval from the government for everything you run in the 
local area” and “As a person or firm in Chinese society, you cannot be independent of the 
government. Love it or hate it, you have to face it.” Respondents also pointed out that both 
the government and the corporate sector are increasingly addressing environmental 
challenges: “The effectiveness of the government [in terms of stimulating pro-
environmental behavior] has surely improved” and “Environmental issues are getting more 
attention and more budget in every firm.” At the same time, these efforts have not kept up 
with the deterioration of the natural environment. As the general manager of a refractory 
firm argued: “Although we are now more developed, pollution has intensified. Our minds 
are changing against this backdrop. (…) It is, of course, difficult to fix it immediately. (…) 
More promising outcomes may materialize in three to five, or even ten, years.” 
Qualitative evidence for Hypothesis 2.1. Interviewees echoed that the pressure to 
engage in environmental practices initially increases with administrative hierarchical 
distance, but eventually tapers off as this distance becomes larger. The observations that 
“the higher the governmental level, the more importance is attached to environmental 
issues” (provincial government official) and “higher-level decisions or policies are 
extremely impactful on subordinates” (municipal environmental protection bureau chair) 
suggest that environmental governmental policies are implemented top-down. The 
mounting pressure mechanism was illustrated by a statement like: “Every lower 
[government] level implements some part of the policies of superior levels” (CEO of a 
diversified business group). 
However, the evidence also suggests that central government influence dissipates, 
and even gets challenged, at lower levels. Explanatory factors mentioned include the larger 
distance from the central government, leading to more perceived autonomy and different 
policy priorities. Local governments are seen as “small emperors (…) whose local policies 
trump central ones” (CEO of an environmentally proactive firm). As a municipal EPB 
chair explained, “at the local level, economic development is for sure prioritized”, because 
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“the local government is evaluated on the basis of GDP”. In a similar vein, the CEO of an 
environmentally proactive firm argued, “looking at GDP growth is much easier and faster 
for [a local government official’s] promotion”. This is enhanced by the dependence of the 
local EPBs on local governments, because the former has to “coordinate with the 
municipal government on many things.” Several interviewees also pointed to the lack of 
implementation capacity at the local level, as evidenced by such a statement as: “There are 
so many things [to be monitored at the local level] but so little staff” (provincial 
government official).  
Qualitative evidence for Hypothesis 2.2. The idea that regulatory stringency in 
more polluting sectors enhances the mounting pressure effect on environmental practices 
was supported by our qualitative evidence. Most firms in the traditional industries, 
categorized as “heavily polluting”, are obliged to adopt online monitoring equipment for 
waste gas and waste water emissions, from which the EPBS can instantly observe any 
abnormal emissions. Firms must report excess emissions immediately, explaining the 
situation and the plan to solve the incident within a day. Firms in sectors characterized as 
environmentally friendly do not have such obligations, even though they may still harm the 
natural environment. According to a municipal government official, “the [environmental] 
awareness is stronger in potentially very polluting firms.” In a similar vein, the CFO of an 
environmentally demanding chemical firm argued that “environmental protection policy is 
coercive: it is not possible to ignore it because punishment [of non-compliance] is severe.” 
The Vice General Manager of a coal-mining firm said, “Every level of government is 
watching us”. In contrast, firms in sectors that face less regulatory pressure to reduce their 
emissions are not very concerned over environmental outcomes, as illustrated by the CEO 
of a garbage disposal firm: “The government is pushing us to develop [without invasive 
legislation]. (…) We do not address environmental issues in our firms that much as our 
product already helps [to protect the environment].”  
Regulatory stringency also strengthened the increasing autonomy effect. This was 
especially observable amongst highly polluting firms controlled by lower levels of 
government. For instance, “When the local environmental protection bureau wants to close 
our factories because of violation of environmental regulations, the punishment will be 
waived because [the municipal government] needs our tax revenues” (CEO of a refractory 
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firm). A manager in a municipal EPB echoed: “I have seen many civil servants at the 
municipal level making money through channels other than their salaries. They do not run 
highly polluting firms themselves, such as paper mills. But they get the money through 
kinship, like from the wife’s firm.” 
Qualitative evidence for Hypothesis 2.3. Our interviews suggested that state 
financial participation attenuated the impact of administrative hierarchical distance on 
corporate environmental practices. The vice General Manager of a chemical firm affirmed: 
“We do not get the backing of strong governmental support, as the state is not the largest 
shareholder in our firm… Thus we need to strictly comply with the environmental 
regulations; otherwise we will for sure be caught… Firms with higher state ownership, on 
the other hand, can afford to bend the rules from time to time”. The Chair of the 
Environmental Protection Department of the same firm echoed: “Although in appearance 
we have the provincial government controlling us, essentially we still believe that we are 
more of a private firm that needs to address the environmental issues carefully”. 
We also found evidence of risk-aversive behavior when top management team 
members were personally liable for corporate misconduct, causing the shape flip at higher 
values of state financial participation. The Chair of the Environmental Protection 
Department of a largely state-owned mining firm contended that “Our leaders are in charge 
of such a large state-owned firm that they would not take the risk of getting a circulated 
note of criticism in our province [because of environmental malpractice] (…) Why would 
they take the risk of not spending [state] money to solve pollution problems? In addition, 
environmental performance will be a part of our leaders’ evaluation.” In a similar vein, an 
engineer in charge of chemical emissions and environmental protection of a largely state-
owned thermal power firm explained: “There is no need to take such a risk. The money 
belongs to the state, but the liability is personal [if any accident happens].  
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion  
2.6.1 The multifaceted influence of the Chinese state  
The rapidly increasing importance of emerging economies has not only led to a reshuffling 
of the geo-economic landscape, it has also proliferated important environmental challenges 
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like increased natural resource depletion, pollution of the natural environment, and 
greenhouse gas emissions. In our study, we explored how the state seeks to ensure 
effective environmental governance in the context of the world’s largest emerging 
economy, China. Our quantitative evidence clearly suggests that the Chinese government 
indeed has a ‘green grip’ on listed firms. 
This grip is not equally strong at all levels of administrative hierarchical distance, 
however. When the governmental body supervising a company is itself subordinate to 
higher authorities, the effects of the position in the political hierarchy initially tend to 
accumulate with distance. This leads to mounting compliance pressures, as manifested in 
additional corporate environmental activities. However, this effect is countered and 
eventually overtaken by another effect, the increasing extent of autonomy listed firms 
enjoy due to the divergent policy priorities of governmental organs operating at a certain 
distance from the central government. These opposing forces produce an inverted U-
shaped relationship between administrative hierarchical distance and corporate 
environmental practices. Furthermore, we found that regulatory stringency strengthens this 
curvilinear effect, whereas state financial participation weakens it. Taken together, our 
study demonstrates the multifaceted influence of emerging market governments on 
corporate environmental practices. 
2.6.2 Towards a phenomenological understanding of state influence in China 
Recently, influential scholars have developed a better quantitative understanding of the 
impact of the Chinese state on local firms’ social and environmental behavior (e.g. Luo et 
al., 2016; Marquis et al., 2011; Marquis and Qian, 2014). Their studies have enhanced our 
knowledge of how the Chinese state apparatus responds to social and environmental 
challenges. We would also make a plea, however, for more qualitative work in the Chinese 
context, as our phenomenological understanding of the culturally conditioned human 
motivations behind state influence and firms’ compliance behaviors is currently still 
underdeveloped.  
To interpret our own statistical results phenomenologically, we conducted 
extensive interviews with representatives of major Chinese firms, the Chinese EPB (at 
different levels), and Chinese environmental NGOs. These interviews taught us that 
individuals, organizations, and society in general are constantly aware of the influence of 
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the administrative hierarchy. For example, Chinese managers and officials strive “to avoid 
troubles whenever possible” (duo yi shi bu ru shao yi shi), while they show deferential 
behavior towards hierarchically superior individuals or organs. Each time the first author, 
who conducted the interviews, was introduced by the CEO’s secretary to an interviewee, 
he/she would point up and say, “she’s arranged by the top (shang mian)”, and nobody 
would question the interview process anymore. In a more general sense, and in ways 
unimaginable in the West, Chinese firms consider themselves to be “grandsons” (sun zi, 
also meaning “being very subordinate”) of the government, and therefore subjected to its 
(paternal) authority. Governmental bodies are considered to be like “parents” (fu mu guan), 
or even “grandfather(s)” (ye), who have the authority to decide everything for the local 
area, much like senior members do for a family in a feudal society. Our interviews 
similarly suggest that Chinese firms feel they have little influence over the content of new 
environmental policies by the central government, even though there may be some room to 
bargain with local governments over the pace and scope of their implementation. Our 
interviews also taught us that environmental compliance behavior in China occurs in a 
somewhat superficial and opportunistic (fu zao) sphere in Chinese society, in which results 
are prioritized over due process. Civil servants look for ways of maximizing their political 
achievements to get personal promotions and benefits, and firms keep a close watch on the 
consequences of others’ compliance behaviors, using these extrinsic cues to decide upon 
their own level of conformity and commitment.  
We would also welcome more qualitative work on the budding NGO sector in 
China. Slowly but surely, grassroots organizations are becoming increasingly effective in 
this context. For instance, several civil protests against paraxylene projects have been 
successful since 2007. However, such events are still being treated as outliers: singular and 
somewhat extreme cases of how civil society can impact environmentalism in China. 
Importantly: not a single interviewee saw the pressure emanating from citizens’ initiatives 
as being anywhere near to that coming from the government, which they took as 
unavoidable and intimidating. 
2.6.3 Theoretical contributions  
Our study offers several theoretical contributions. First, disentangling the multiple facets 
of government influence on corporate environmentalism is a novel approach. Existing 
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studies have acknowledged that different policy instruments may have dissimilar effects on 
environmental practices (e.g. Kemp et al., 2012) or that different stakeholders may express 
divergent claims (e.g. Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Sharma and Henriques, 2005), but have 
typically assumed that stakeholders like the government act in coherent and consistent 
ways. Our study demonstrates that the nature of government influence differs across 
hierarchical levels, leading governmental bodies at different echelons to prioritize 
dissimilar policies. This may be counterproductive, in particular when lower tiers in the 
administrative hierarchy foster unconstrained industrial expansion whereas the upper tiers 
promote environmental sustainability. Rather than observing decoupling between 
(government) policy and (corporate) practice (Bromley and Powell, 2012), we gauged a 
certain degree of environmental ‘policy-policy decoupling’ between higher and lower 
levels of government. Such inconsistencies may also occur in developed countries. For 
instance, the federal government of the United States seeks to mitigate climate change, 
whereas states richly endowed with fossil fuels develop conflicting public policies (Vogel, 
Toffel, Post, and Uludere, 2012). We thus go beyond the view of government as a unitary 
entity that puts forth consistent environmental policies, and move towards an 
understanding of government influence as being contingent on the divergent interests of 
governments at different hierarchical levels. China might even be a conservative case in 
this respect: if we already found multifaceted state influences in a one-party autocratic 
state, the degree of heterogeneity and complexity is likely to be even more pronounced in 
pluralistic federal states like the United States and Germany. It is of great theoretical and 
empirical importance that this complexity is explored further in future research. 
Second, our research is one of the few large-scale, cross-sectorial empirical 
studies of corporate environmentalism in an emerging economy. Most studies of 
government influence on corporate environmental practices focus on developed countries 
(Bansal and Hoffman, 2012; Wijen et al., 2012), or offer only anecdotal evidence on 
specific emerging market cases (e.g. Child and Tsai, 2005). Gauging the influence of the 
government on the environmental practices of listed firms in China has helped us develop 
a deeper understanding of how grave environmental challenges can be contained more 
effectively. However, we have also shown that the simultaneous pursuit of economic 
growth and environmental protection straddles governmental policy, with different 
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priorities attributed at different administrative levels. This suggests that environmental 
protection in this emerging economy is only semi-institutionalized (Marquis and Raynard, 
2015; Child et al., 2007), situated at the stages of regulatory compliance and strategic 
environmentalism (Bansal and Hoffman, 2012). We thus contribute to the corporate 
environmentalism literature by assessing the contemporary impact of government 
intervention on the corporate environmental practices in the world’s largest emerging 
economy. 
2.6.4 Limitations  
Our study has some limitations, the first of which involves our reliance on publicly 
disclosed information. We relied on annual reports for information about environmental 
practices. While we made an effort to triangulate this information with other sources, we 
did not have access to intrafirm data (Branzei, Ursacki-Bryant, Vertinsky, and Zhang, 
2004), such as emissions at the plant level (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). When 
environmental policies have more firmly taken root in China, more fine-grained data will 
likely become available. Second, some of our evidence is indirect. In the absence of a 
direct measure, we took changes in sectorial emissions as a proxy for regulatory stringency 
(Brunel and Levinson, 2016). Future research may shed more light on the corporate 
perception of regulatory stringency (Kalamova and Johnstone, 2012). Third, heavily 
regulated companies may report their environmental practices more ostentatiously to 
demonstrate compliance (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Reid and Toffel, 2009). This may 
have biased our observations somewhat, although we have sought to mitigate this effect by 
holding as many other factors as possible in our regression models. Finally, our study was 
situated in the world’s largest emerging economy. While other economies with 
underdeveloped institutional capacity (Guillén and Capron, 2015) may share a number of 
characteristics with China, the idiosyncratic political system of the latter may limit the 
generalizability of our findings to other emerging economies.  
2.6.5 Conclusion  
Our study shows the ‘green grip’ of the Chinese government to be multifaceted. This may 
be indicative of how governments of emerging economies have to make difficult policy 
choices to reconcile the objectives of sustaining economic growth and prioritizing 
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environmental sustainability. Our findings have several public policy implications. Since 
both very low and very high administrative hierarchical distance yield relatively low levels 
of corporate environmental practices, (central) governments eager to enhance 
environmental performance should focus their efforts more on companies supervised by 
governmental bodies situated at the extremities of the administrative hierarchy spectrum. 
Furthermore, our findings show that as long as environmental protection is only semi-
institutionalized in China, governments may wish to tighten their environmental 
regulations across sectors and regions. This may entail revising the processes of 
performance assessment of and resource allocation to lower-level governmental bodies. 
Finally, the central government should keep a closer eye on firms with a medium degree of 
state financial participation, as such firms are more prone to pursuing economic objectives 
at the expense of environmental performance.   
  
Multifaceted State Influence on Corporate Environmental Practices 
54 
 
 
 55 
 
Chapter 3. Differences in Environmental Management System Adoption among 
Chinese Business Group Affiliates5
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate differences in environmental management system adoption among business 
group affiliates in China. We propose a theory suggesting that affiliated firms are either 
sensitive or resistant to environmental compliance pressures, based on their strategic 
characteristics. Using a panel dataset of Chinese listed firms observed between 2008 and 
2012, we examine a variety of characteristics that affect business group affiliates’ 
decisions to adopt an environmental management system. We find that being affiliated to a 
family-owned business group and having a business model centered on business-to-
consumer markets increase the sensitivity of affiliated firms to societal pressures that favor 
the adoption of formal environmental management systems such as ISO 14001. 
Conversely, being a core member of a business group and being shielded by corporate 
political connections make affiliated firms more resistant to environmental compliance 
pressures. Our study contributes to the literature on business group strategy, strategic 
corporate environmentalism, and China studies. 
  
                                                             
5 This study is conducted in collaboration with Pursey Heugens and Frank Wijen. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The recent shift from developed economies to emerging markets as the primary drivers of 
global economic growth has brought with it an increasingly challenging set of 
environmental issues. A particular issue is the importance of heavy industry to emerging 
economies, and the development of the world’s economy more generally. Due to the high 
dependence on heavy industries for economic growth (Child and Tsai, 2005; Govindaraju 
and Tang, 2013) as well as institutional voids in the market and governing systems 
(Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Li, Meng, and Zhang, 2006) in emerging markets, tremendous 
greenhouse gas emissions and extremely high energy consumption have accompanied this 
dramatic shift in the global economy. In 2014, China singlehandedly generated 17 percent 
of the world’s GDP based on purchasing power parity, while the sum of the contributions 
of all 26 major developed economies totaled 40 percent (World Bank, 2015). Meanwhile, 
over the past decade, China has surpassed the United States in terms of CO2 emissions and 
energy usage and is now responsible for over 20 percent of global emissions (World Bank, 
2015). As such, China’s obviously significant role, both in terms of its contribution to the 
global economy and to greenhouse gas emissions, warrants increased scholarly attention. 
What is more, the prominent role of the state in China and differences between the 
institutional environments in China and Western industrialized nations challenge 
conventional wisdom on environmental management practices (Child et al., 2007; Marquis 
and Qian, 2014). 
The shift in global industrial production from the West to China in particular has 
also been accompanied by a less readily observable transition, notably a shift in 
organizational forms responsible for production tasks. In the West, industrial production is 
largely the purview of standalone firms and their wholly owned subsidiaries, whereas in 
China, business group affiliates account for the bulk of industrial production. Thus far, the 
implications of this shift in organizational form in terms of corporate management 
practices have been largely overlooked. Scholarly neglect of this subject is somewhat 
surprising, as it has long been noted that business groups are prevalent in emerging 
economies (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001), despite the fact that there is variation in terms of 
shareholder control over such groups. Controlling shareholders range from the government 
in China (Zhang, Sjögren, and Kishida, 2016), to entrepreneurial families in Argentina and 
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India (Lamin, 2013) and major commercial banks in Thailand (Wailerdsak and Suehiro, 
2012). In China, the total sales revenues of the largest 1000 registered business groups in 
2013 reached 90.25% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP; 86.25% of the Gross National 
Product), up from 36% in 1997 (China Enterprise Evaluation Association, 2014; National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014). If we seek to understand the growing environmental 
issues created by China, we need to understand how Chinese business group affiliates 
respond to mounting societal pressure for environmental accountability. 
To date, very little attention has been paid to any form of strategic heterogeneity 
among business group affiliates. Instead, studies of business groups have focused largely 
on the financial consequences of business group affiliation (e.g. Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; 
Luo and Chung, 2005; Vissa et al., 2010; Lamin, 2013; Manikandan and Ramachandran, 
2015; Yiu, Bruton, and Lu, 2005), affiliates’ characteristics in relation to observed 
differences in performance (Keister, 1998; Chang and Hong, 2000; Carney, Shapiro, and 
Tang, 2009), and in organizational practices related to within-group profit redistribution, 
such as propping and tunneling (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2003; Bertrand, Mehta, and 
Mullainathan, 2002; Chung and Luo, 2008). Much less attention has been paid to 
explaining the heterogeneity of strategic choices made by business group affiliates (Carney, 
Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen, and Oosterhout, 2011), despite the fact that variance in 
terms of strategic decision-making among affiliates is considerable. For example, the 
expansion strategy employed by affiliates has been shown to be affected by the 
characteristics of the business group a focal firm belongs to and by its prominence within 
the business group (Dau, Ayyagari, and Spencer, 2015). To date, however, the types of 
factors that drive the heterogeneous strategic decisions made by business group affiliates 
have been largely glossed over.  
Our paper seeks to unpack the sources of strategic variance among business group 
affiliates. Specifically, we focus on a single strategic decision, the adoption of a formal 
environmental management system (EMS) in a single national context, China. Due to a 
combination of increasingly stringent legislation, government pressure and concerns at the 
level of civil society, firms, particularly listed firms in China, are under significant 
pressure to take visible action in the area of environmental protection (Child et al., 2007; 
Marquis and Qian, 2014). We investigate the extent to which firms experience the pressure 
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to take action to protect the environment. Our key research question is: ‘how do pressure 
sensitivity and pressure resistance affect the strategic adoption of environmental 
management systems by listed business group affiliates in China?’ To explore this question, 
we draw on an existing typology of pressure-sensitive versus pressure-resistant actors 
(Brickley, Lease, and Smith, 1988; Kochhar and David, 1996), in which business-related 
and other actors attempt to influence managerial actions. 
In our theorizing, affiliates’ pressure sensitivity to environmental compliance 
pressures emanates from their social need to establish and maintain corporate social and 
reputational capital. We explore affiliates’ pressure sensitivity in terms of their: (a) being 
affiliated with a family-owned business group; (b) being the ‘downstream’ part of the 
business group that has a business model centered on business-to-consumer deliveries; and 
(c) being affiliated with a more visible business group. In contrast, affiliates’ pressure 
resistance derives from the privileges they enjoy as a result of their shielded status in the 
business groups to which they belong. We explore affiliates’ pressure-resistance in terms 
of their: (a) being a core member of a group; (b) being associated with a highly diversified 
and informationally opaque business group; or (c) being shielded from environmental 
pressures by political ties connecting the business group to the ruling political elite. We 
test our argument empirically in our analysis of a panel dataset consisting of data on 169 
Chinese listed firms, covering the period between 2008 and 2012.  
Our study makes several novel theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
relevant literature. First, it unpacks the drivers of strategic heterogeneity among business 
group affiliates. Existing studies have devoted sufficient attention to the comparison 
between business group affiliates and stand-alone firms (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Vissa 
et al., 2010; Lamin, 2013) and the relevant driving forces behind affiliate performance 
(Luo and Chung, 2005; Yiu et al., 2005). We offer fresh insights including an exploration 
of the drivers behind the heterogeneous strategic decisions made by the affiliates. In 
treating business group affiliates as a unique unit of analysis, we aim to set the stage for 
future within-group analyses of strategic behavior. Second, our study sheds light on the 
adoption of environmental strategies in a critical organizational form, the business group, 
in China, the world’s largest emerging economy. The aforementioned shift in global 
production has brought about contextual and institutional changes that include a change in 
Chapter 3 
59 
 
the organizational forms that account for global production (i.e. a shift from standalone 
firms to business group affiliates, as the latter are prevalent in emerging economies). Our 
study sheds new light on the way in which pressure sensitivity and pressure resistance in 
the area of environmental protection efforts shape Chinese affiliate firms’ impact on global 
energy consumption, pollution reduction and economic development (International 
Monetary Fund, 2015; World Bank, 2015). Third, our research enriches the existing body 
of work on environmental management and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in 
China by moving beyond a sole focus on the role of government in these areas (Child et al., 
2007; Luo et al., 2016; Marquis and Qian, 2014). While the government undeniably plays 
an important role in the Chinese context, we show that corporate attributes at both the 
group and organizational levels are also important predictors of the adoption of 
environmental protection measures by corporations in China. This helps us understand 
differences in environmental performance across corporations in the world’s most 
environmentally taxing economy and allows for a more comprehensive understanding of 
corporate environmental behavior in the Chinese context (Marquis and Raynard, 2015). 
3.2 Business Group Prevalence and Strategy  
The shift in global economic growth from Western countries to emerging markets has 
brought to light the prevalence and influence of the business group as an organizational 
form in these markets. Business groups, originally referred to as economic groups (Leff, 
1978), are collections of legally independent firms that enjoy a high level of informal 
cooperation (Granovetter, 1995). Within these groups, the affiliates share similar interests 
and engage in joint strategic decision-making and take joint strategic actions (Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001). Business groups are distinct from the multidivisional corporations that 
appear in the West (cf. Chandler, 1962; Mahoney, 1992) in that affiliates are not wholly-
owned subsidiaries. Affiliates are incorporated separately and constitute legally 
independent businesses, despite the fact that they may have (minority) equity ties to other 
firms in the business group (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Granovetter, 1995; Vissa et al., 
2010). In spite of their legal independence, affiliates are also different from strategic 
alliances, in that they are subject to the governance of a core unit, which, depending on the 
context, is usually made up of entrepreneurial families (Lamin, 2013), banks (Boehmer, 
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2000), or the state (Zhang et al., 2016). The core unit governs via formal or informal 
hierarchical structures (Vissa et al., 2010).  
In China, the core unit is usually the state. While the number of private business 
groups has expanded in recent years, the state-owned groups are still economically 
dominant (Lee and Kang, 2010). In 2012, the ten largest business groups in China were all 
state-owned enterprises, and accounted for 20.6% of the country’s GDP (China Enterprise 
Evaluation Association, 2014). In addition, of the 69 enterprises from mainland China that 
were listed on the Fortune Global 500 list, 64 were or were affiliated with state-owned 
business groups, compared to only five privately owned ones (Fortune, 2016). 
So why are business groups so prevalent in China? What essential functions do 
they fulfill in the contemporary Chinese economy? While these questions have been 
addressed about business groups in a variety of other national settings, in the context of a 
variety of different disciplinary paradigms (Guillén, 2000; Yiu, Lu, Bruton, and Hoskisson, 
2007), we explore the essential functions of business groups in emerging economies below, 
using Chinese cases for illustration.  
Reducing transaction costs. Business groups are relatively efficient vehicles in 
terms of reducing the transaction costs of preventing or circumventing market failure 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000a; Lamin, 2013). In emerging markets that are informationally 
opaque, the costs associated with access to technology and labor, contract enforcement and 
financing for trade are often quite high (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Under these conditions, 
business groups outcompete stand-alone firms by making use of their internal markets to 
enhance contractual enforcement and reduce transaction costs (Leff, 1978; Keister, 1998). 
As a result, while conglomerates have largely disappeared in developed economies due to 
the unwieldiness of this organizational form, business groups serve to alleviate systemic 
uncertainty and financing costs of integration and thus remain crucial in the context of 
emerging markets such as China (Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Lui, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 
1997; Ma, Yao, and Xi, 2006).  
For example, the New Hope Group, a front-runner in the agriculture sector in 
China and Asia, has branched out into the financial, real estate and investment sectors, the 
profits from which are used in large part to support their core business. In the meantime, 
the integration of upstream and downstream aspects of the feed industry, from agriculture 
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technology to food processing, channel construction and facility building, reduces 
transition costs and affords the group increased pricing and bargaining power in the global 
marketplace (Guo and Lin, 2005; New Hope Group, 2016). This case illustrates that in 
emerging economies, business groups facilitate the allocation of capital and resources 
through the integration of industries, thereby reducing the cost of the related internal 
transaction (Ma et al., 2006).  
Substituting for institutional intermediaries. Scholars in this stream link the 
‘reduction of transaction costs’ argument to the inefficiency and high costs observed in 
emerging markets such as China as a result of institutional voids. The ability of business 
groups to efficiently mobilize resources makes them a possible substitute for institutional 
intermediaries and suggests that they may contribute to the improved performance of their 
affiliates (Chittoor, Kale, and Puranam, 2015). In the event that institutional voids are 
present in capital, labor, production and technology markets due to lack of sufficient 
financial or regulatory institutions in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b), 
business groups compensate by collecting and pooling resources internally among their 
affiliates (Carney et al., 2011; Manikandan and Ramachandran, 2015).   
Consider, for example, the role of an internal capital market in providing a 
substitute for the lack of a sound venture capital system in China. With overall investor 
protection in mainland China among the weakest in the world (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 
2005), external financing is generally very scarce and expensive to acquire (He, Mao, Rui, 
and Zha, 2013). The internal capital market within a business group enables self-financing. 
The investment-cash flow sensitivity of business group affiliates in China is dramatically 
lower than that of unaffiliated corporations, indicating that affiliates are substitutes for 
costly external financing and are, therefore, subject to far fewer financial constraints (He et 
al., 2013). 
Developing and leveraging unique capabilities. A third line of research explores 
the mechanisms underlying the emergence of business groups from a resource-based 
standpoint (Barney, 1991; Guillén, 2000). Business groups are better able to maintain their 
valuable and inimitable skills than non-diversified stand-alone firms because of their 
sustained access to crucial resources (Guillén, 2000). Studies in this stream contend that 
business group affiliation bolsters the use of critical resources, tangible or intangible, in 
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emerging markets that are undergoing dramatic market-oriented institutional changes. 
These critical resources include information sharing within the group and reputation 
signaling vis-à-vis potential clients (Chang and Hong, 2000; Lamin, 2013).  
Haier Group in China, for instance, the world’s biggest player in the realm of 
major appliances since 2009 (Euromonitor International, 2014), has shared its experience 
and reputation as being highly committed to quality with all of its branches beyond just its 
original core business of fridge production (The Economist, 2013a). Being service oriented, 
one of the most important and enduring contributors to Haier group’s success, has 
facilitated the domestic and even global expansion of the group, as Haier Group better 
identifies and satisfies customer needs than its competitors (Subhadra, 2003), especially in 
the Chinese context with its low corporate orientation towards service quality.  
State cooptation and state capitalism. In addition, state activism theorists view the 
formation of business groups not just as an organizational response to the environment, but 
as an organizational device used to achieve economic and political objectives specified by 
autonomous states (Amsden, 1992; Lee, 2012), or as a means of clarifying issues related to 
ambiguous ownership in emerging economies (Ma et al., 2006; Morck, 2012). 
Governments guide and facilitate the growth of markets and business groups by increasing 
the availability of critical resources (Lee and Jin, 2009; Zhang et al., 2016) and harnessing 
cultures and institutions (Tsui-Auch and Lee, 2003). The close control of resources enables 
the state to strategically manipulate the behavior of business groups to its advantage  (Kim, 
Hoskisson, Tihanyi, and Hong, 2004; Sutherland and Ning, 2015; Yiu et al., 2007). This is 
particularly evident in the case of China, as the government enjoys primary control of most 
business groups. After China opened and restructured its economy after the Second World 
War and endured a civil war and a long Cultural Revolution, the state was eager to 
rejuvenate the economy by establishing state-controlled business groups as a testing 
ground in which to experiment with various reform policies including importing and 
exporting, mergers and acquisitions and foreign investment (Zhang et al., 2016). Business 
groups have greater access to financial resources in China not only because the big 
commercial banks are state-controlled, but also because private and institutional investors 
are confident that state-owned business groups will not go bankrupt (Zhang et al., 2016).  
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The petrochemical industry has been an important pillar of the Chinese economy, 
contributing more than five percent to the national GDP every year in the past three 
decades (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the PRC, 2016). Sinopec, for 
example, was founded in 1983 and reformed into a giant business group. When the 1998 
financial crisis stroke Asia, the petrochemical industry in China experienced its first deficit.  
In order to sustain the steady economic growth in China, the State Council urged the 
establishment of the Sinopec Group, during which the integration of upstream and 
downstream, supply-production-sale, and domestic and foreign trade in the petrochemical 
industry was facilitated with the help of the state (State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council, 2013). Ranked fourth in the Fortune 500 
in 2016, Sinopec Group is a strong arm of the state that singlehandedly contributes three 
percent to the national GDP (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2016). 
In addition to the fact that business groups form and are maintained as a result of 
contextual factors present in emerging economies, scholars have also identified differences 
in terms of strategy between business groups and standalone firms that were revealed by 
the shift in organizational form, away from the standalone firm in the West toward the 
business group. Scholars have attempted to examine the effects of the different strategic 
decisions made by business groups, such as financial decisions (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000a), foreign expansion decisions (Dau et al., 2015), and diversification decisions 
(McGuire and Dow, 2009). However, studies in this field most of the times compare 
business group affiliates with standalone firms, even when exploring strategic behavior 
(Lamin, 2013; an exception being Dau et al., 2015). They are also based on the assumption 
that the principal source of variance in enacted strategy patterns and, ultimately, corporate 
performance, is the distinction between affiliation and independence. While this type of 
comparative research design can yield important insights, it also tends to overlook 
important strategic heterogeneity within the group of affiliated firms and tends to ignore 
the diverse underlying mechanisms through which business groups exert influence on the 
strategic behavior of their affiliates (Carney et al., 2011).  
Moreover, despite their importance in emerging or imperfect markets, the 
questions of whether and how business groups and their affiliates strategically exert 
societal influence remain unanswered. As emerging markets have become the engine of the 
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global economic growth (Marquis and Raynard, 2015), scholarly neglect of the most 
important organizational form in this setting, the business group, and its role in addressing 
the increasingly serious social issues at play must be addressed. In this study, we focus on 
one important strategic decision business group affiliates face: whether or not to adopt an 
environmental management system.  
3.3 Strategic Importance of Environmental System Adoption 
Over the past few decades, integrating socially responsible activities, in particular those 
related to protecting the environment, into business activities has become a priority 
(Flammer, 2015; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Starik, Throop, Doody, and Joyce, 1996). Certain 
business activities have led and continue to lead to systematic degradation of the natural 
environment. Phenomena such as climate change and air pollution and the overuse of 
energy threaten humankind’s continued existence and endanger the planet (Odum, 1989; 
UNEP, 2016). Over time, improving corporate performance in the area of the environment 
has become more than just an obligatory financial or regulatory burden to be dealt with. It 
is becoming a competitive advantage to be able to meet growing human need with limited 
resources (Rosen, 2001; Russo, 2009). Consequently, long-term environmental strategies 
that seek to manage the interface between the natural environment and business activities 
(Sharma, 2000) have been developed to capitalize on upside opportunities like improved 
financial performance (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996) and social legitimization (Westley 
and Vredenburg, 1991).  
Third party evaluation and/or certification have played a role as long-standing 
indicators of the effort that firms have made in order to address their environmental 
challenges (Toffel, 2000). Environmental management systems (EMS) are formal systems 
with voluntary ecological standards that cover dimensions such as “articulating goals, 
making choices, gathering information, measuring progress, and improving performance” 
and are regularly audited by a professional third party (Florida and Davison, 2001: 64). On 
the one hand, some studies have shown that international environmental management 
systems (EMS) have a positive influence on corporate environmental performance 
(Montabon, Melnyk, Sroufe, and Calantone, 2000), as they require formal systems that 
included clearly articulated goals, credible information, as well as provisions for standard 
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evaluation and regular auditing (Russo, 2009). Under stakeholder and institutional 
pressures from governmental actors, customers, competitors and the community (Delmas 
and Toffel, 2004), firms adopt these systems out of strategic self-interest (Rosen, 2001). In 
other studies, international standards on EMS bring about paradoxical consequences 
including the inability to initiate additional environmental activities that extend beyond the 
original system (De Colle, Henriques, and Sarasvathy, 2014); the superficial or temporary 
adoption of an EMS as a “signal” to external parties (Johnstone and Labonne, 2009); or the 
generation of a “reverse decoupling” effect such that firms seek international certification 
to improve their reputation in spite of the fact that they have already established strong 
environmental performance (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005). As most of the corporate 
environmentally friendly actions in China are generally only advocated, instead of strictly 
implemented or monitored at present (Luo et al., 2016), the adoption of EMS in Chinese 
firms appears a relatively proactive environmental strategy in terms of corporate 
environmental performance. For one thing, establishing a sound environmental system that 
ought to be regularly audited requires Chinese firms to engage in a series of costly and 
comprehensive fundamental environmentally friendly activities (Florida and Davison, 
2001). For the other, it represents a comparatively direct, authentic, and observable  
environmental effort a firm makes, in response to the ever-growing expectation from the 
Chinese government on corporate environmental performances (Marquis and Qian, 2014).   
The shift in contribution to world GDP based on purchasing power parity by 
percentage from developed to emerging economies has been caused in large part by the 
rise of China (World Bank, 2015, see Figure 3.1). This shift has led to increased 
environmental concerns in emerging economies and sharp criticism directed at them as a 
result (e.g. The Economist, 2013b). Figure 3.2 shows the change in share of the world’s 
total CO2 emissions and energy usage of the two largest economies, China and the US, 
over the past 50 years. The overwhelming pressure from civil society, and political 
agreements on environmental issues in emerging economies have triggered the wider 
adoption of EMS, particularly in China, as elaborated above. Figure 3.3 shows the number 
of firms that have opted for an international EMS, the ISO 14001, in both major developed 
and emerging economies in the world between 1996-2012 (World Bank, 2015). The 
exponential increase in adoption among Chinese firms is noteworthy. As business groups 
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are the major organizational form in emerging markets, of which China is a prime example, 
in this study, we explore the strategic heterogeneity among Chinese business group 
affiliates by investigating the adoption of the several most-widely-adopted international 
and national EMS certifications in China as evidence of the manifestation of corporate 
environmental strategy.  
Figure 3.1 Contribution to World GDP Based on PPP by Percentage 
(Source: World Bank, 2016)6
 
 
  
                                                             
6 ‘Other’ emerging economies as identified by key market actors including the Dow Jones, FTSE, IMF, MSCI, 
Russell, and S&P listed in Marquis and Raynard (2015). These emerging economies are Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, and South Africa.  
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Figure 3.2 Comparison of CO2 emissions and energy consumption as a Percentage of 
Total World Emissions of the US and China 
(Source: World Bank, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 The Number of Firms that have Adopted an ISO 14001 Environmental 
Management System 
(Source: World Bank, 2015) 
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3.4 Hypotheses: Pressure-Sensitive and Pressure-Resistant Affiliates 
In this paper, we probe the strategic decision to adopt corporate EMS to reveal how 
different factors bring about strategic heterogeneity across business group affiliates. We 
propose that group membership matters in terms of EMS adoption. We consider two 
categories of organizational-level characteristics that may influence a business group 
affiliate’s EMS adoption strategy: pressure sensitivity and pressure resistance. Pressure-
sensitive attributes originate from social needs that make business group affiliates 
susceptible to exogenous pressures to implement an environmental strategy. Pressure-
resistant characteristics, on the other hand, are attributable to strong privileges business 
group affiliates derive from their organizational form, enabling them to withstand 
environmental pressures. 
3.4.1 Environmental strategy adoption among group affiliates—drivers of pressure 
sensitivity 
Studies have suggested that it is rational for firms to adequately address the expectations of 
legitimate stakeholders in terms of corporate moral duties (O’Riordan and Fairbrass, 2014). 
Business group affiliates are sensitive to certain institutional pressures, especially those 
connected to the public good, as affiliates have a social need to sustain their accumulated 
social capital or established brand images (Delmas and Toffel, 2004). Intangible resources 
like this are always at risk when firms are dependent on stakeholders that are sensitive to 
corporate environmental performance. These stakeholders include wealthier communities 
and concerned customers with higher demands in terms of their living conditions and that 
have the capacity to have a greater impact on corporate performance (Deng, Kang, and 
Low, 2013; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006; Delmas and Toffel, 2004). We consider three 
characteristics to be indicators of the concept of (environmental) pressure sensitivity 
among business group affiliates that might make firms more likely to adopt an EMS out of 
a consideration of eliciting support from stakeholders: family ownership, having a business 
model centered on business-to-consumer deliveries and exposure to the civil society and 
investors. 
Family-led business group. An increasing number of family-operated firms have 
been listed on stock exchanges and have had an increasing impact on Chinese society 
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(Ding, Zhang, and Zhang, 2008). Family businesses are more inclined to adopt CSR 
strategies (and environmental strategies in particular) for several reasons (Déniz and 
Suárez, 2005). First, due to a strong sense of family obligation to maintain control over 
successive generations and the fact that major managers in family businesses are also 
important shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), family executives have an incentive to 
make decisions that enhance performance and pay offs in the long run (Steier, 2003). 
Second, improved standing in the community and a better reputation amount to increased 
“social insurance” (Hoffman, Hoelscher, and Sorenson, 2006) for family firms, which in 
turn intensifies the tendency of family-led groups to uphold their social responsibilities 
(Dyer and Whetten, 2006). Lastly, the alignment of interests between control and 
ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and the sense of identity based on common social 
bonds between group affiliates (Lamin, 2013) reduce internal transaction costs and enable 
the dominant influence of families to effectively reach out to all affiliates (Dyer, 2006). As 
such, it is reasonable to expect that affiliation with a family-owned business group would 
lead firms to be more proactive in terms of the environment than private or state-owned 
firms in light of increased public attention to environmental protection in China in recent 
years. 
Fuyao Group is a prominent case in point. In 2012, Dewang Cao, founder and 
current chair of the group, was described as the “most generous philanthropist in China” as 
he (and his family) donated 3.64 billion RMB (approximately 562 million USD) to public 
goods, culture and environmental protection that year. After failing to retain two general 
managers in the group, Mr. Cao realized the importance of sustaining a sense of corporate 
responsibility in his family business. After he finally persuaded his oldest son who had 
settled down in the United States to come back to China and take over the company, he 
passed on his awareness of social responsibility and his desire to make a contribution to 
society to his son. In addition the firm’s pioneering adoption of a series of international 
EMS, in 2012, the Fuyao Group’s production became the most energy efficient among its 
counterparts. Cao stated, “…in doing so many positive things, I have established sufficient 
credibility and reputation for my employees and my son (the current General Manager of 
the group) to build upon” (Chen and Zhang, 2014). This exemplifies the way in which a 
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business group’s family identity has an impact upon its social and environmental 
stewardship.  
Downstream positioning of the affiliate. The role an affiliate plays in the upstream 
and downstream blueprint of a business group determines its CSR strategic positioning. 
Affiliates in the upstream area, those directly involved in business-to-business, or 
industrial trade, are not usually confronted with pressures related to environmental 
activities. The ones in the downstream area, however, are more dependent on consumer 
approval, as their ‘societal obligations (including those related to environmental activities) 
are more visible to consumers  (Brown and Dacin, 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). 
Consumers’ purchasing decisions have been linked to companies’ CSR records, as 
environmental issues have become an increasingly salient focus of public concern (for 
more references, see Russo and Fout, 1997). Damage to the reputation of one affiliate 
among the consumers could cause a spillover effect, damaging the entire group. Positive 
responses from consumers, on the other hand, enhance the competitiveness of a CSR 
strategy in terms of generating corporate revenues in the future (Flammer, 2015; Lev, 
Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan, 2010). The adoption of an EMS is therefore more 
strategically proactive (Dupire and M’Zali, 2016) if an affiliate finds itself in the 
downstream area of a business group geared towards B2C deliveries.  
The effort and investment made in the area of environmental performance by 
Tsingdao Brewery Group, producing one of China’s most popular beer brands, illustrate 
the importance of environmental strategies to a firm running a business-to-consumer (B2C) 
model. The company’s CEO, Kexing Huang, has said that “the value of human beings is 
greater than that of objects, and therefore society is more important than a single firm”. 
The Chair of the Production Management Section echoed this sentiment when he stated 
that “as consumers are paying more attention to low-carbon life style, the trend of 
choosing green and environmentally friendly products is being strengthened. Consumers 
will decide whether our products satisfy their tastes using the money in their hands. People 
born in the 1980s and 1990s pay special attention to environmental protection; if we do not 
perform well environmentally, not only our products, but our brand and whole group will 
not be popular [any more]. [Now that we take this into account,] I believe our sales data 
speaks for itself.” Tsingdao Brewery Group has kept its growth in sales around 8% per 
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year while other firms in the brewing sector have seen a 3% growth rate on average 
(Xinhuanet, 2015). 
Societal visibility. Firms need social license granted formally and informally by a 
broad set of external stakeholders to operate (Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014), the 
importance of which is magnified by their societal visibility. That the media increasingly 
conveys corporate news to the public brings with it not only commercial opportunity, but 
also uncertainty from the standpoint of the firm (Kjær and Langer, 2005). The presence of 
the internet further expedites the transmission of information to and from the public in 
what may be unpredictable ways (Lee, Oh, and Kim, 2013). Therefore, the more media 
attention a business group has received, the more likely it is that the group members will 
be highly sensitive to societal pressures and the unpredictable consequences of media 
exposure due to the visibility of their business group. Firms, particularly when the chances 
of being exposed to the public are high, will therefore strive for legitimacy (Bitektine, 
2011; Campbell, 2007) and be more likely to integrate systematic approaches such as the 
adoption of an EMS by their core businesses (Zhu and Sarkis, 2004). 
A noteworthy example of this was when the Chinese media aggressively 
increased the visibility of listed firm and MNC donations after the catastrophic earthquake 
in Wenchuan, China in 2008 (Xu, Xin, and Zhu, 2011; Zhang and Luo, 2013). Wanke, a 
leading business group in the real-estate industry in China, made a 200,000 RMB donation 
on the day of the earthquake, which was followed by an immediate and overwhelming 
onslaught of criticism on the part of the media and civil society that brought the group’s 
commitment to CSR into question. During the shareholders’ meeting held about a month 
later, Wanke decided to donate another 100 million RMB to the recovery effort in 
Wenchuan (Tencent Culture, 2014). We expect to see a similar effect exerted by increased 
media attention on a firm on the likelihood of adoption of an EMS.  
In summary, we propose that the three aforementioned factors affecting pressure 
sensitivity, namely, family ownership, B2C business model and societal visibility, have a 
positive influence on the adoption of an EMS: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Family ownership, downstream positioning, and societal visibility 
of business group affiliates increase the likelihood of adopting an environmental 
management system. 
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3.4.2 Environmental strategy adoption among group affiliates—drivers of pressure 
resistance 
Business group affiliates tend to resist institutional pressures related to public goods if they 
experience a high degree of organizational protection attributed to powerful agentic 
protectors and the privilege they possess as a result of their organizational structure. Such 
organizational protection shields affiliates from having to assess the severity of profit-
unrelated issues such as environmental practices and to perform (in an environmentally 
friendly way) accordingly. For example, while some studies have confirmed the role of the 
state in inducing environmentally friendly corporate performance (Delmas and Toffel, 
2004; Marquis and Qian, 2014), state ownership also has the potential to open the door to 
lenient standards to prevent irresponsible activities (Tang and Tang, 2015). Managers of 
state-owned firms are not faced with an incentive to improve their performance due to the 
lack of an effective monitoring system (Jiang, Yao, and Feng, 2013). If shareholders 
become concerned that non-productive social responsible activities might bring about 
competitive disadvantages to a firm (Deng et al., 2013), they become strong forces of 
resistance to CSR activities (Lyon, Lu, Shi, and Yin, 2013). We propose a second set of 
attributes that business group affiliates possess under conditions of informational opacity 
and patronage by powerful protectors, which empower them to withstand pressures that 
favor EMS adoption: being core to the group’s identity, diversification of the business 
group, and the presence of potential benefits from political connections. 
Core member of a group. Business groups tend to fill ownership voids to facilitate 
economic reform, especially in emerging economies (Ma et al., 2006) where the property 
rights of firms are not clear (Peng, 2000). This brings about a separation of ownership and 
control in business groups (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005) or managerial 
opportunism (Type I) problems. Under these conditions, managers may take actions that 
benefit them privately (Berle and Means, 1932; Jansen  and Meckling, 1976) or may have 
to deal with high costs due to the divergent interests of dispersed shareholders, both of 
which lead to inefficiency (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005). Furthermore, Type 2 
agency problems occur when business groups have the unfortunate combination of (a) 
dominant owners and (b) structures that decouple voting from cash flow rights, such as 
pyramidal holdings or dual-class shares (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Nicodano, 1998). This 
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often leads to the expropriation of minority shareholders by dominant ones (Yiu et al., 
2007) for private gains or to balance profitability across affiliates (Classens, Fan, and Lang, 
2006; Morck et al., 2005). In addition, concentrated ownership is found to be negatively 
associated with social initiatives, as these initiatives will come at the financial expense of 
large shareholders while benefitting other stakeholders (Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988; 
Dam and Scholtens, 2013). We contend that this problem appears more pronounced when 
there is a separation between ownership and control among affiliates in business groups in 
emerging economies. Ultimate owners effectively control business groups by strategically 
assigning themselves to key managerial positions and/or through a corporate pyramidal 
ownership structure (Yiu et al., 2007). In the meantime, these ultimate owners lose a 
certain amount of control as they indirectly own the group affiliates and thus experience a 
“wedge” between their degree of control and cash flow rights (Kali and Sarkar, 2011). The 
smaller the wedge, the more core an affiliate is to the group and the more priority it enjoys 
in absorbing resources within a group at the expense of more peripheral members (Dau et 
al., 2015). In emerging economies such as China where environmental actions are not 
strictly monitored, a smaller wedge provides an affiliate more privileges to be shielded 
from external pressures. Therefore, we hypothesize that a business group affiliate with a 
smaller wedge, indicating that the affiliate is a core member of a business group, will be 
more likely to resist the pressures to take action to adopt an EMS.  
By July, 2012, four of the top ten business groups listed on the two Chinese stock 
exchanges whose core business activities are in the iron and steel industry had established 
an EMS. Of the four, only two of the groups (Baosteel and Tisco) adopted an 
internationally acknowledged EMS by 2012 (Huang, 2013). The wedges in these affiliates 
were between zero and 0.16 in the iron and steel industry, indicating a highly core identity, 
compared with a maximization of 42.35 of the wedge in the whole sample,. 
Group diversification. Diversification, especially in emerging economies, lowers 
the risks associated with the absence of institutions in external capital and labor markets by 
facilitating the exchange of internal resources within a business group (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000a; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). Moreover, the ability of business groups to mobilize 
resources between affiliates engaged in different production lines serves to relieve pressure 
from powerful consumers and/or civil society in relation to environmental performance or 
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social responsibility (Vyakarnam, Bailey, Myers, and Burnett, 1997). Firms associated 
with more diversified business groups share the risks and pressures with their sister 
affiliates (Guthrie, 1997) and are thus less likely to play as pivotal a role in terms of 
safeguarding the future of the business group as those belonging to less diversified groups. 
Moreover, as diversification makes a business group’s information regime more diffuse 
and opaque, the attribution of responsibility to individual affiliates becomes more complex 
and difficult (Khanna and Palepu, 2007). When reduced information transparency leads to 
nebulosity in terms of responsibility a business group’s affiliates may tend to act less 
responsibly. Therefore, we expect affiliates of more diversified business groups to be less 
pressure sensitive and therefore more likely to resist adopting an EMS.  
Hubei Yihua Group, a highly diversified business group whose affiliates are 
active in eleven different industries, for example, has resisted societal demands for more 
environmentally friendly practices for a decade (Sina Finance, 2013). The firms in the 
group, including the ones in and just outside the area where the headquarters is located, 
have been warned, fined, and even suspended multiple times by the local government to 
remedy their adverse environmental behavior, yet without promising outcome (Sina 
Finance, 2016). 
Political connections. External monitoring of group affiliates is regarded as being 
more difficult than the monitoring of unaffiliated firms, as close links to the political 
apparatus of the business group tend to shield affiliates from outside interference (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2007). Intermingling between the economic and political spheres is especially 
prevalent in emerging economies in the context of the operation of business groups 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000b; Fisman and Khanna, 2004). The state nominates and assigns 
the executives of large state-owned business groups to people who hold equivalent 
positions in the political hierarchy in China. Meanwhile, Chinese business groups also 
have bargaining power in terms of the extent to which they follow the state’s guidance or 
function as “small kingdoms” (Brødsgaard, 2012). Business groups in China tend to be 
closely intertwined with the state and may therefore be insulated from external pressures 
and may focus more on maximizing profits, partially for the benefit of the local 
government (Shi and Zhang, 2006). Consequently, we expect affiliates that are more 
Chapter 3 
75 
 
politically connected to be more pressure resistant than those that lack such protection 
from the government on environmental issues. 
Executives secure governmental protection of financial investment, property 
rights and societal legitimacy by means of structural state ownership or the establishment 
of political connections in China (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Zhou, 2013). If firms and the state 
cover for each other too often, however, it might jeopardize corporate financial and social 
performance (Xinhuanet, 2014). Approximately 60% of the top management team of 
Shenhua, a large mining business group, is made up of ex-civil servants and/or current 
members of the National People’s Congress and/or National Committee of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference. Environmental NGOs including Greenpeace 
have called the business group out for its environmental irresponsibility and have criticized 
the apparent media blackout, where negative news on Shenhua’s environmental 
malpractices was quickly removed after the state intervened (Greenpeace, 2013).  
In summary, we propose that the three factors affecting pressure resistance, 
namely, core identity to a group, group diversification and political connections, have a 
negative influence on the adoption of an EMS.    
Hypothesis 3.2: Being a core member, degree of diversification, and political 
connections in a business group affiliates decreases the likelihood of adopting an 
environmental management system. 
3.5 Methods 
3.5.1 Sample and data 
We chose China as our research setting for several reasons. First, China is currently the 
largest emerging economy and has become the world’s largest economy in terms of 
purchasing power parity as of 2014 (IMF, 2015). As such, corporate activities in China 
have a profound impact on the global economy and society. Second, a substantial portion 
of long-lasting GDP growth in China can be attributed to the contribution of Chinese 
business groups (China Enterprise Evaluation Association, 2014). In other words, as China 
has become a major player in the world, so have Chinese business groups (Lee and Kang, 
2010) and given their increasingly important role, this organizational form deserves a 
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closer look. Third, China has become the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases and 
consumer of energy over the past decade, suffering from the consequences of its own air 
pollution. Therefore, having a better understanding of what prompts Chinese business 
groups to adopt a system that seeks to enhance the environmental performance is of both 
theoretical and empirical importance. 
In an effort to investigate the different factors that make business group affiliates 
sensitive or resistant to pressure to adopt an environmentally friendly strategy, as indicated 
by the adoption of an environmental management system, we developed a longitudinal 
dataset that provides information on Chinese listed firms between 2008 and 2012. Since 
2008, regulatory and societal attention has increasingly focused on social and 
environmental issues in China. Also in 2008, the former State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) was transformed into the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP), placed at highest administrative level in the hierarchical Chinese political 
governing system. The MEP as a ministerial agency has since been tasked with drafting 
laws and making high-level decisions pertaining to the environment in conjunction with 
other ministries at the central state level. Furthermore, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (SSE and SZSE) 
followed suit and issued guidelines on CSR disclosure for listed firms in 2006 and 2008. 
These events marked the beginning of the more wide-spread adoption of international 
standard environmental management systems by Chinese firms (see Figure 3.3) and 
ushered in a period of increased transparency, comprehensiveness and concreteness in 
environmental reporting (Luo et al., 2016).  
Our sample is based on information from the Main Boards of both the SSE and 
SZSE. We included all 374 firms (1630 observations) whose primary businesses are in the 
sectors that are currently being subjected to increased government scrutiny, particularly in 
the area of environmental performance. As environmental reporting and the adoption of an 
EMS are not compulsory for Chinese listed firms, we chose to investigate the sectors that 
are most likely to face pressure to improve environmental performance and take relevant 
actions. According to the Directory of Industrial Classifications for Listed Firms Subject to 
Environmental Protection Inspections, issued by the MEP in 2008, these sectors include 
thermal power, iron and steel, cement, electrolyzed aluminum, coal, metallurgy, 
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construction materials, mining, chemicals, petrifaction, pharmaceuticals, light industry, 
textiles and leather goods. We excluded firms that received a ‘Special Treatment’ (ST) tag 
from the relevant stock exchange, which is given in response to the detection of financial 
irregularities, including reporting financial losses for two consecutive years or failing to 
provide an audit report from a certified accounting firm, etc. (China Stock Market 
Handbook, 2008). We excluded ST firms from our analysis as they face various trading 
and financial restrictions that may create an incentive for them to manipulate their reports 
in an effort to shake the ST designation (Firth et al., 2011).  
We identified the business groups the affiliates belong to using the “graph of 
ultimate owner structure” contained in the annual reports, where the structure of a firm’s 
ownership and control is presented. We verified this information in accordance with the 
definition of ‘business group’ provided in the still-valid Provisional Regulations for the 
Administration of Business Group Registration in China (1998), issued by the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC). The definition specifies the following: 
1) the core company must have registered capital of over 50 million RMB, with at least 
five affiliated companies; 2) the business group has registered capital (including the core 
and the affiliated companies) of over 100 million RMB total; and 3) each member 
company of the business group is a distinct legal entity. After carefully extracting the 
business group information from the annual reports, our sample included 732 observations 
from 166 business group affiliates spanning the period of 2008 to 2012. 
3.5.2 Variables and measures 
Dependent variables 
Adoption of an environmental management system. We use a dummy variable to specify 
the adoption of an EMS by a listed firm and business group affiliate. We assigned a value 
of 1 if a firm has obtained an international or national EMS certification that is common in 
China, including the ISO 14001 EMS Standard, GB/T24001 (identical to ISO 14001 in 
China), certification from the National Occupational Safety Association (NOSA) and/or 
GAP (good agricultural practices by FAO).  A value of 0 is given if the firm has not 
implemented an EMS. Since the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the 
NOSA and the FAO do not provide a complete list of all firms that have adopted an EMS, 
we used triangulation and mined information from the firms’ annual reports and official 
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websites. We crosschecked this information with data provided on the Certification and 
Accreditation Unified Business Information Search Platform website (in Chinese).  
Independent variables 
Family ownership. We used a dummy variable to indicate family ownership. Based on data 
from the ultimate ownership graph in annual reports, this variable was marked as 1 if there 
was a note specifying kinship of the shareholders and 0 otherwise. We crosschecked the 
data using the online search engine Baidu.com by performing searches of a business 
group’s name with the keyword “family” (jia zu in Chinese) to be sure that the annual 
reports simply did not include this information. 
Business-to-consumer model. To operationalize the second pressure-sensitive 
factor, we used affiliate firms’ SIC codes specified by the SSE and SZSE to identify 
whether or not it operated according to a business-to-consumer (B2C) model. We 
compared the categorization in the two stock exchanges with the categorization used in a 
study by Srinvasan, Lilien, and Sridhar (2011) and assigned a value of 1 to those that were 
B2C oriented and 0 otherwise. 
Societal visibility. To test the third pressure-sensitive factor in the context of 
Hypothesis 1, we measured the public visibility of a firm on the basis of exposure in the 
news media. We used Baidu News, the news site of the largest Chinese search engine, to 
search for mention of focal firms and count how many times the firms were reported on in 
different news items in each year. To reach this number, we subtracted the number of 
repeat reports of the same news item from the total stories mentioning the relevant firm.  
Core member of a group.  We used the separation of control rights and ownership 
rights to measure the degree to which affiliates are ‘core’ members of their business groups 
when testing Hypothesis 2. The closer ownership and control are, the greater the chance 
that the firm will be given priority over other member firms and, as such, be ‘core’ to the 
business group. Data for this variable originated from the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) and was updated annually. 
Group diversification. To measure the second factor, group diversification, when 
testing Hypothesis 2, we measured the number of sectors in which a business group 
operates. We extracted relevant information from the business groups’ official websites 
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and annual reports, compared the areas of business they conduct to the SIC code specified 
by the stock exchanges and then used a total count for this variable. 
Political connections. To establish the extent to which a firm is politically 
connected, we calculated the percentage of top management team (TMT) members of the 
focal firm that concurrently work for a government organ or are members of the National 
People Congress (NPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC).  
Control variables 
Firm size. We used annual turnover to measure an affiliate’s size. Data for this variable 
was collected from the CSMAR dataset and was log-transformed. 
Export percentage. We used the revenue an affiliate obtains from exports as a 
percentage of total sales to capture its dependence on international markets. Data for this 
variable was collected from the firms’ annual reports and was log-transformed. 
Years in the field of an affiliate. We computed the number of years an affiliate 
had been operational in its current field. This data was collected manually from firms’ 
annual reports and official websites. 
CSR report. We used a dummy variable to indicate whether or not a firm had 
issued a CSR or environmental report. We assigning a value of 1 if CSR and/or 
environmental report was issued and 0 if not. If a report was integrated into the annual 
financial report, we also assigned a value of 1. However, when the financial report only 
contained isolated paragraphs pertaining to CSR or the environment, we assigned a value 
of 0.  
Registered capital of a business group. We used the log-transformed registered 
capital of the business group to which a focal firm belongs. Data for this variable was 
collected manually from business groups’ official websites. 
Years in the field of a business group. We computed the number of years that had 
elapsed since the business group was founded. Data for this variable was collected 
manually from business groups’ official websites. 
East China location. We used a dummy variable to indicate whether or not an 
affiliate is based in East China. We assigned a value of 1 when the affiliate was located in 
East China and 0 if not. 
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Provincial GDP per capita. The annual data for this variable was collected from 
the China Statistical Yearbook, and was log-transformed. 
Environmental NGOS. We calculated the number of environmental NGOs in the 
province where the focal affiliate was located. The annual data was taken from the China 
Statistical Yearbook. 
Environmental quality. We took the average concentration of particulate matter 
10 pollutants (i.e., noxious solid or liquid particles with a diameter of 10 micrometers or 
less) in the air of the capital city of the province in which the focal affiliate was located. 
The annual data was taken from the China Statistical Yearbook and was log-transformed.  
3.5.3 Regression method 
We used STATA 14.0 to analyze the panel data. As we aim to estimate the likelihood of 
the adoption of a corporate EMS, our dependent variable is measured as a binary variable 
that captures whether or not there is adoption at the affiliate level. A linear probability 
model (LPM) using multiple linear regression (OLS) is simple to estimate and use, but it 
suffers weaknesses like the possibility of generating a predicted probability of less than 
zero or larger than one (while this should be between zero and one), revealing an 
unrealistic marginal effect and containing heteroskedasticity (Long, 1997; Wooldridge, 
2008). Although weighted least squares (WLS) estimators could solve the 
heteroscedasticity issues, all observations need to meet strict requirements to fit the model. 
The limitations of LPM or even WLS could be overcome by using binary response models 
like probit and logit models, thought they are more difficult to interpret. We used probit 
random effect models in this study, a model that has been used in other studies that have 
relied on similar data to ours (e.g. King et al., 2005; Wood, 2009; Stern and James, 2015), 
and we also applied logit random models as a robustness check. We used random effects 
models because we analyzed several variables that describe the intrinsic, time-invariant 
properties of firms, business groups or industries, such as the registered capital of a 
business group. Using a fixed effects model would eliminate these time invariant effects, 
as the effects of variables with a constant value over time are swept away by the fixed 
effects transformation (Greve and Goldeng, 2004; Wooldridge, 2008).  
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3.6 Results 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations. Table 3.2 presents 
our probit regression results. Model 1 includes all the control variables. Models 2-4 are 
separate regressions for Hypothesis 1, while models 5-7 are for Hypothesis 2. Model 8 is 
the full model.  
3.6.1 Hypotheses tests 
As shown in Model 8 in Table 3.2, we find support for both of our hypotheses. Affiliation 
with a family-owned business group (b = 2.84, p = 0.015) and operating according to a 
B2C business model (b = 1.70, p = 0.014) are significantly positively associated with the 
adoption of an environmental management system. We also find that the variable ‘core 
member of a group’, measured by separation of ownership and control (b = 0.06, p = 
0.028, the more core a member, the smaller of the value of the wedge), the diversification 
of the business group an affiliate belongs to (b = -0.44, p = 0.017) and the political 
connectedness in top management teams (b = -5.80, p = 0.031) are significantly negatively 
related to environmental management system adoption. As we did not find a significant 
result in Model 6 (see Table 3.2), the mechanism of diversification of a business group is 
only partially supported. We did not find strong statistical evidence that societal visibility 
of a business group (b = 0.00, p = 0.71) exerts any noticeable influence on EMS adoption 
by business group affiliates. In sum, we found partial support for both Hypotheses 3.1 and 
3.2. 
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0.15 
-0.13 
-0.08 
-0.13 
-0.02 
-0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
-0.19 
17. C
SR
 report  
0.45 
0.5 
0 
1 
0.49 
-0.06 
-0.04 
0.13 
0.10 
-0.08 
0.18 
0.36 
0.00 
   
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
11. Y
ear in the field firm
 
0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Y
ear in the field group 
0.08 
0.43 
 
 
 
 
 
13. G
roup registered capital * 
-0.13 
-0.15 
-0.13 
 
 
 
 
14. G
D
P per capita
* 
0.07 
-0.05 
0.06 
0.11 
 
 
 
15. N
um
ber of E
N
G
O
 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.12 
-0.28 
 
 
16. E
nvironm
ental quality
* 
-0.08 
0.05 
0.02 
0.02 
-0.26 
0.25 
 
17. C
SR
 report 
-0.01 
0.05 
-0.01 
0.14 
0.15 
-0.05 
-0.12 
N
 = 732, C
orrelations w
ith an absolute value greater than 0.07 are significant at p < 0.05. 
* Log transform
ed. 
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Table 3.2 Influence of Pressure-Sensitive and Pressure-Resistant Factors on the 
Adoption of an EMS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Family business  2.27    
  
2.84 
 
 (1.30)    
  
(1.17) 
B2C business model   1.97   
  
1.70 
 
  (0.69)   
  
(0.69) 
Societal visibility    0.00  
  
0.00 
 
   (0.00)  
  
(0.00) 
Core member of a group     0.07 
  
0.06 
 
    (0.04) 
  
(0.03) 
Diversification of the group      -0.13 
 
-0.44 
 
     (0.17) 
 
(0.18) 
TMT political connection      
 
-4.77 -5.80 
 
     
 
(1.84) (2.69) 
Revenue 0.40 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.51 0.35 0.54 0.63 
 
(0.28) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.15) (0.24) 
East 0.55 0.86 0.73 0.74 0.98 0.75 0.65 0.66 
 
(0.73) (0.71) (0.66) (0.60) (0.82) (0.61) (0.37) (0.67) 
Export percentage -0.56 -2.23 -0.93 -0.56 -0.30 -0.60 0.19 -1.42 
 
(4.41) (6.15) (4.40) (5.19) (4.50) (5.14) (2.80) (4.92) 
Year in the field firm 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year in the field group -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Group registered capital -0.15 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 
 
(0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.26) (0.17) (0.10) (0.18) 
GDP per capita 1.99 0.99 2.40 0.80 1.61 0.77 1.05 1.09 
 
(1.11) (0.70) (0.79) (0.64) (0.96) (0.63) (0.40) (0.72) 
Number of environmental NGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Environmental quality  -18.02 -9.14 -13.64 -10.73 -14.80 -11.52 -15.70 -8.87 
 
(19.80) (17.38) (18.05) (16.29) (19.66) (15.75) (10.65) (14.66) 
CSR 7.38 9.22 7.33 7.92 7.37 7.93 4.93 5.40 
 
(0.84) (0.71) (0.67) (0.59) (0.73) (0.58) (0.37) (0.59) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
     
   Constant -38.20 -25.84 -46.12 -23.52 -37.29 -22.80 -27.15 -32.34 
 
(16.65) (9.49) (11.43) (8.57) (13.67) (8.54) (5.64) (9.45) 
 
     
   Observations 754 754 754 753 732 754 754 731 
Number of idcode 169 169 169 169 166 169 169 166 
Wald chi square 144.99 325.90 228.99 271.17 149.93 284.39 235.42 153.42 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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The interpretation of the results of a probit model is not as straightforward as it is 
of LPM or OLS estimations as probit models use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
to measure non-linear relationships (Wooldridge, 2008). To interpret effect sizes, we used 
the margins command in Stata 14 to see how the likelihood of EMS adoption is influenced 
by the independent variables. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.3. We 
use Model 7 in Table 3.3 to interpret the effect size below. The likelihood of adopting an 
EMS is increased by 22 percent (p = 0.018, s.e. = 0.09) if an affiliate belongs to a family-
owned business group as compared to an affiliate of a non-family-owned business group. 
The likelihood is increased by 13 percent (p = 0.017, s.e. = 0.05) if an affiliate operates 
according to a B2C model as compared to one that operates according to a B2B model. A 
one-unit change in the degree of separation of control and ownership increases the 
likelihood of EMS adoption by 0.4 percent (p = 0.025, s.e. = 0.002), a one-unit change in 
the degree of diversification of the group decreases this likelihood by three percent (p = 
0.021, s.e. = 0.01), and a one-unit change in the degree of political connectedness of the 
top management team decreases the likelihood of EMS adoption by 44 percent (p = 0.03, 
s.e. = 0.20). Consistent with the results shown in  Models 3 and 7 in Table 3.2, public 
visibility of a business group and diversification of the group in Model 5 in Table 3.3 does 
not exert a significant marginal influence on the adoption of an EMS. 
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Table 3.3 Marginal Influences of Pressure-Sensitive and Pressure–Resistant Factors 
on EMS Adoption 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Family business 0.10    
  
0.22 
 
(0.53)    
  
(0.09) 
B2C business model  0.10   
  
0.13 
 
 (0.03)   
  
(0.05) 
Societal visibility   0.00  
  
0.00 
 
  (0.00)  
  
(0.00) 
Core member of a group    0.003 
  
0.004 
 
   (0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
Diversification of the group     -0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
    (0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
TMT political connection     
 
-0.36 -0.44 
 
    
 
(0.14) (0.20) 
Revenue 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
East 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Export percentage -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.11 
 
(0.26) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.26) (0.21) (0.38) 
Year in the field firm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year in the field group -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Group registered capital -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP per capita 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.08 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Number of environmental NGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Environmental quality  -0.39 -0.66 -0.63 -0.74 -0.58 -1.19 -0.68 
 
(0.75) (0.88) (0.84) (1.02) (0.80) (0.80) (1.13) 
CSR 0.39 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.41 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
Observations 754 754 754 732 754 754 732 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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3.6.2 Robustness checks 
We performed several robustness checks. First, we limited the adoption of an EMS, the 
dependent variable, to only the ISO 14001. Almost all of the results remained the same 
(diversification of the group continues to be significant at p = 0.003), while political 
connectedness becomes insignificant and its effect remains negative. This strengthens our 
argument that political connectedness may shield firms and prevent them from adopting 
domestic standards in the absence of strong pressure to adopt international standards. 
Second, we used logit random effect models as an alternative to regression and the results 
were consistent with the probit estimation. Third, we dropped all the firm-year 
observations after the year in which a firm had adopted an EMS, which left us with 605 
observations and 161 firms in our sample. B2C business model, core to group identity and 
political connectedness remained significant, while family business and diversification of 
the group did not. This implies that the variables in the pressure-resistant category are 
slightly more robust than the ones in the pressure-sensitive category. This is somewhat 
intuitive as the power of civil society in China is relatively weak compared to that of the 
state (Child et al., 2007). 
3.7 Discussion 
3.7.1 Summary of main findings 
The environmental challenges that have accompanied the increase in economic 
development in emerging markets, especially in China, have attracted considerable 
scholarly attention (e.g. Child et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2016; Marquis and Qian, 2014). This 
paper sets out to explore a few attributes that business group affiliates possess that shape 
the strategies they employ in the area of environmental protection in China. On the one 
hand, we found that business group affiliates are sensitive to pressures to adopt 
environmental strategies when social capital and/or brand image are at stake. We found 
that being a part of a family-run business group and being largely dependent upon 
consumers as primary stakeholders make affiliates more likely to adopt an environmental 
management system. On the other hand, organizational privileges created by 
organizational protections, namely, being core to group identity, diversification in 
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operating industries and strong political connectedness, shield affiliates from the pressure 
to adopt an EMS. 
3.7.2 Implications 
This article makes several important contributions in relation to research on the adoption 
of environmental protection strategies in emerging markets. First, as ubiquitous as they are 
in emerging markets, our knowledge of how affiliates differ in their strategies while 
maintaining a unified identity in the context of a business group remains quite limited 
(Chittoor et al., 2015; Dau et al., 2015; Manikandan and Ramachandran, 2014). Thus far, 
studies of business groups have thoroughly explored the financial performance of group 
affiliates, especially in comparison to stand-alone firms. Our focus, however, is on the 
business group affiliates, as our unit of analysis and, as such, we have found that 
differences exist between business group affiliates in terms of their environmental 
strategies. This finding enriches and verifies the claim by Dau et al. (2015) and Chittoor et 
al. (2015) that the heterogeneity among business group affiliates is so important that 
merely comparing the differences between business group members and standalone firms 
cannot reveal a complete picture. We thus contribute to the business group literature by 
arguing that different attributes of the business group form create different types of 
organization-specific pressure, leading to differences in strategy. Using business group 
affiliate as the unit of analysis, our paper has pushed the envelope of a more fine-grained 
analysis of heterogeneous strategies within business groups. 
Second, as we shift our focus on corporate environmental protection efforts from 
developed economies to emerging ones, we also have to address the different 
organizational forms that exist. The dramatic reshuffling of the geo-economic landscape 
has made it necessary to conduct more context-specific studies that investigate the 
organizational form most prevalent in emerging markets, namely the business group. The 
literature on corporate environmentalism has treated environmental performance as being 
the product of organizational responses to regulatory and/or political pressure. However, 
variance in the adoption of EMS is also expected to be closely associated to the corporate 
structures (Delmas and Toffel, 2008). The organizational form of and the attributes related 
to business groups have been largely overlooked in the corporate environmentalism 
literature, in spite of their clear importance in the context of emerging economies (Chittoor 
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et al., 2015; Guthrie, 1997; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a). By conceptually unearthing 
different categories of organization-specific pressures faced by business group affiliates 
and their impact on corporate responsiveness to environmental challenges, we contribute to 
the field of corporate environmentalism with a categorization of the environmental 
behavior of business group affiliates. 
Third, the paper makes an important contribution to China studies by offering a 
novel standpoint from which to investigate the pressure that Chinese firms face in this era 
beyond those stemming from the well-researched influence of the autocratic Chinese state 
(Shi and Zhang, 2006; Luo et al, 2016; Marquis and Qian, 2014). As firms in China have 
undergone structural transformations with more independence in terms of corporate 
governance (Luo, 2003), studies exploring firm- and group-level variables are timely. We 
have mapped out different types of factors that may make Chinese business group affiliates 
more pressure sensitive or pressure resistant with regard to the adoption of an 
environmental strategy. Our study flags the importance of diving deeper into the 
characteristics of affiliates of business groups, the leading organizational form, to account 
for corporate environmentalism in China, thereby going beyond the often-studied role of 
the Chinese state.  
3.7.3 Limitations and future research 
A limitation of our study is that we did not have access to official channels through which 
to receive detailed lists on the adoption of corporate environmental management systems 
like the ISO 14001 system. To address this, we did our utmost to triangulate data using 
corporate reports, corporate official websites and an official online platform for 
certification of Chinese firms. Future studies could focus on the adoption of one particular 
type of certification should any official organization release a comprehensive list of firms 
that have adopted that specific standard. Second, our results might be biased, as we were 
not able to include the business group affiliates that are not listed on the Chinese stock 
exchanges. Therefore, our results might only be applicable to firms that are subject to 
greater public exposure. Future research may also shed more light on whether or not 
heterogeneity exists in terms of the adoption of EMS by business group affiliates that are 
and are not listed on the stock exchanges. Future research could also investigate whether or 
not there is heterogeneity among affiliates in the same business group. This would be 
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contingent on more data becoming available. In addition, future studies may also update 
the factors investigated in this study in the next ten years. Since the Chinese civil society, 
plagued by heavy smog in winter, rapidly gains environmental awareness, we expect that 
societal visibility of a business group will soon start to positively influence corporate 
environmental efforts, while the pressure-resistant factors might gradually lose their 
muscle. In-depth qualitative studies are also called for to reveal the precise mechanisms 
underlying the factors we identified in this study. 
3.7.4 Conclusion 
This study enables us to better understand the factors that influence the adoption of certain 
environmental strategies by a major actor, the business group affiliate in China, that has 
been a driver of the global shift in economic and energy consumption away from the West, 
toward emerging economies. It is noteworthy that the need to sustain intangible assets and 
the organizational privileges a business group affiliate enjoys exist widely and 
simultaneously in China. Our findings have several public policy implications. Business 
group affiliates are worthy of special attention as they have grown into a major 
organizational form in emerging economies such as China. In addition, since large 
business group affiliates are very sensitive to certain factors related to their intangible 
assets, it is advisable that governments should promote efforts to the increase 
environmental awareness of the public. Moreover, the government should take more 
responsibility for keeping a closer eye on firms that are stronger and have organizational 
privileges that may facilitate their resistance to environmental pressures from society. 
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Appendix 1 Measuring the Administrative Hierarchical Distance 
 
 
The construct of “administrative hierarchical distance to the central government” was 
computed differently for SOEs than for non-SOEs. It was calculated for SOEs as the 
hierarchical distance from the controlling governmental organ (the ultimate owner) to the 
central government. For the non-SOEs, it is the distance from the level of the 
administratively nearest and lowest governmental organ to the central government, plus 
one unit from a firm to its administratively nearest and lowest monitoring government. We 
offer two examples using Figure A.1 to illustrate how the variable is computed. 
Figure A.1 Examples of structural relations between a firm and its controlling 
governmental body 
 
(a) SOE    (b) non-SOE 
Qingdao Beer listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, serves to illustrate the 
measurement of the distance variable for SOEs. Figure A.1(a), positioning the structure of 
a firm’s ultimate controller in Qingdao Beer’s annual report, shows that “Qingdao State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission” (Qingdao SASAC) is its 
ultimate controller. As the firm has an equivalent hierarchy as its controller in the Chinese 
bureaucratic system, the distance from Qingdao Beer to the central government is 
measured as the distance from Qingdao SASAC to the central government. As Qingdao 
SASAC is a department of Qingdao Municipality, which is a subprovincial municipality, 
we can deduct from Table 2.2 that the administrative hierarchical distance to the central is 
1.5 for Qingdao Beer.   
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Haodangjia, listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange, illustrates our measurement 
of the distance variable for non-SOEs. We used the location of their registered working 
address to identify the distance between the body implementing the state’s environmental 
policy and the central government. From Haodangjia’s annual report (see Figure A.1(b)), 
we see its working address is “Shandong Province, Rongcheng City, Hushan Town”, 
indicating the nearest and administratively lowest level of government supervising 
Haodangjia is Hushan Town. From Table 2.2 we see that there are 4 steps for SOEs from 
township to the central government. As we add another unit from a firm to its nearest and 
lowest controlling government, given the fact that they do not have an equivalent hierarchy 
in the political system, the administrative hierarchical distance from Haodangjia to the 
central government amounts to 5.  
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Appendix 2 Interviewee List 
 
 
Respondent 
ID 
Organization 
ID 
Respondent 
information 
Organization 
information Time 
1 Firm A CEO Steel slag recycling firm 
9:00-10:00 
Aug. 6, 2014 
2 Firm A Chief Engineer Steel slag recycling  firm 
10:00-11:30 
Aug. 6, 2014 
3 Government B Dept. chair Provincial EPB 16:00-17:30 Aug. 6, 2014 
4 Business Group C Chair Business group 
9:30-10:30 
Aug. 7, 2014 
5 Business Group C Chief Manager 
Affiliate: waste 
solid recycling 
10:30-11:30 
Aug. 7, 2014 
6 Business Group C Chair assistant Business group 
11:30-13:30 
Aug. 7, 2014 
7 Business Group C Employee 
Affiliate: waste 
solid recycling 
13:30-14:30 
Aug. 7, 2014 
8 Firm D Chair 
Agricultural water 
conservation 
company 
14:30-16:30 
Aug. 8, 2014 
9 Business Group E CFO 
Chemical business 
group 
14:00-14:40 
Sep. 1, 2014 
10 Business Group E Employee 
Chemical business 
group 
14:50-16:30 
Sep. 1, 2014 
11 Business Group E 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Chemical business 
group 
16:35-17:15 
Sep. 1, 2014 
12 Business Group E 
Head of Section of 
Environmental 
Protection and 
Safety 
Chemical business 
group 
17:20-18:00 
Sep. 1, 2014 
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13 Business Group E 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate: thermo 
power plant 
8:30-9:30 
Sep. 2, 2014 
14 Business Group E Worker 
Affiliate: thermo 
power plant 
9:30-10:00 
Sep. 2, 2014 
15 Business Group E 
Vice General 
Manager 
Chemical business 
group 
14:30-15:30 
Sep. 2, 2014 
16 Business Group F 
Head of Section of 
Environmental 
Protection and 
Safety 
Coal and chemical 
group 
8:30-9:30 
Sep. 3, 2014 
17 Business Group F 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate: chemical 
firm 
10:30-11:30 
Sep. 3, 2014 
18 Business Group F 
Head of Section of 
Planning and 
Development 
Coal and chemical 
group 
14:00-15:00 
Sep. 3, 2014 
19 Business Group F 
Chief of Chair's 
office 
Coal and chemical 
group 
15:00-16:00 
Sep. 3, 2014 
20 Firm G CFO Coal company 8:30-9:30 Sep. 5, 2014 
21 Firm G Chief Engineer Coal company 9:30-10:30 Sep. 5, 2014 
22 Government H Civil servant 
Human Resources 
and Social 
Security Bureau 
8:30-9:30 
Sep. 10, 2014 
23 Government I Vice Chair Municipal EPB 10:00-11:30 Sep. 10, 2014 
24 Firm J General Manager Refractories firm 15:00-16:30 Sep. 10, 2014 
25 Firm K 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Car manufacturer 10:30-11:30 Sep. 11, 2014 
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26-27 Firm K 
Two employees at 
Dept. of Public 
Relations 
Car manufacturer 14:00-15:00 Sep. 11, 2014 
28 Firm K Head of Dept. of Energy Saving Car manufacturer 
15:00-16:00 
Sep. 11, 2014 
29 Firm K 
Employee at Dept. 
of Environmental 
Protection 
Car manufacturer 16:00-17:00 Sep. 11, 2014 
30 Business Group L 
Two Chair 
assistants 
Coal and chemical 
group 
17:30-21:00 
Sep. 14, 2014 
31 Business Group L Chair assistant 
Coal and chemical 
group 
8:30-9:00 
Sep. 15, 2014 
32 Business Group L 
Vice General 
Manager 
Coal and chemical 
group 
9:00-9:30 
Sep. 15, 2014 
33 Business Group L General Manager 
Coal and chemical 
group 
9:30-9:45 
Sep. 15, 2014 
34-35 Business Group L 
Two managers 
together 
Affiliate 1: thermo 
power plant 
14:00-15:30 
Sep. 15, 2014 
36-39 Business Group L 
Four managers 
together 
Affiliate 2: coal 
firm 
8:30-11:30 
Sep. 16, 2014 
40-41 Business Group L 
Two managers 
together 
Affiliate 3: coal 
firm 
14:00-16:00 
Sep. 16, 2014 
42 Business Group M 
Employee at Dept. 
of Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate 1: 
Thermo power 
plant 
9:00-10:00 
Sep. 17, 2014 
43 Business Group M Chief Engineer 
Affiliate 1: 
Thermo power 
plant 
10:00-12:00 
Sep. 17, 2014 
44 Business Group M 
Engineer at Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate 1: 
Thermo power 
plant 
14:00-15:00 
Sep. 17, 2014 
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45-46 Business Group M Two managers 
Affiliate 1: 
Thermo power 
plant 
16:00-17:30 
Sep. 17, 2014 
47 Business Group M 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate 1: 
Thermo power 
plant 
10:00-11:00 
Sep. 18, 2014 
48 Business Group M Chief Engineer 
Affiliate 2: 
Thermo power 
plant 
14:00-15:00 
Sep. 19, 2014 
49 Business Group M Chair assistant 
Affiliate 2: 
Thermo power 
plant 
15:00-16:00 
Sep. 19, 2014 
50 Business Group M 
Engineer in charge 
of energy saving 
Affiliate 2: 
Thermo power 
plant 
8:30-9:30 
Sep. 22, 2014 
51 Business Group M 
Engineer at Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate 2: 
Thermo power 
plant 
9:30-10:30 
Sep. 22, 2014 
52-53 Business Group M Two managers 
Affiliate 2: 
Thermo power 
plant 
10:30-12:00 
Sep. 22, 2014 
54 Business Group M 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate 3: 
Thermo power 
plant 
14:00-15:00 
Sep. 23, 2014 
55 Business Group M 
Engineer in charge 
of energy saving 
Affiliate 3: 
Thermo power 
plant 
15:00-16:00 
Sep. 23, 2014 
56 Business Group M 
Engineer in charge 
of emission 
reduction 
Affiliate 3: 
Thermo power 
plant 
16:00-17:00 
Sep. 23, 2014 
57 Business Group N Chief Engineer 
Affiliate: Food 
and beverage firm 
8:00-8:30 
Sep. 24, 2014 
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58 Business Group N 
Engineer in charge 
of emission 
reduction 
Affiliate: Food 
and beverage firm 
8:30-10:00 
Sep. 24, 2014 
59 Business Group N Chair 
Affiliate: Food 
and beverage firm 
10:00-11:00 
Sep. 24, 2014 
60 Business Group N 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate: Food 
and beverage firm 
14:00-15:30 
Sep. 24, 2014 
61 Business Group N 
Employee at Dept. 
of Environmental 
Protection 
Affiliate: Food 
and beverage firm 
15:30-16:30 
Sep. 24, 2014 
62 Firm O Employee Waste solid disposal company 
8:30-9:30 
Sep. 25, 2014 
63 Firm P Chair Waste solid disposal company 
9:30-11:00 
Sep. 25, 2014 
64 Firm Q Industry analyst Security company 11:00-12:00 Mar. 16, 2013 
65 Firm R CEO Fertilizer company 14:00-15:00 Mar. 16, 2013 
66 Government S Vice Head Municipal EPB 9:00-9:50 May 2, 2013 
25 Firm K Engineer Car manufacturer 12:00-13:00 May 2, 2013 
67 NGO T Chief Secretary Environmental NGO 
17:00-18:00 
May 15, 2013 
68 Firm U Industry analyst Security company 15:30-16:30 Jun. 15, 2013 
69 Firm V 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Car manufacturer 10:00-11:00 Jun. 17, 2013 
70 Firm W Industry analyst Security company 15:00-16:00 Jun. 20, 2013 
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71 Firm X Chair assistant Garbage disposal company 
17:00-18:00 
Jun. 28, 2013 
72 Firm Y 
Head of Dept. of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Iron and steel 
company 
11:30-12:30 
Jul. 1, 2013 
73 Government Z Vice Head County EPB 14:20-15:10 Jul. 2, 2013 
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Summary 
China has accomplished remarkable economic achievement during the past several 
decades. Yet, it has been confronted with unprecedented, overwhelming pressures to 
address its severe environmental challenges, both from domestic and international 
societies—all the more since the world has become increasingly critical on non-sustainable 
developmental strategies. While the corporate environmentalism literature has shed light 
on how different stakeholders such as government, industry, and civil society can exert 
their influences on corporate environmentalism in developed economies, there is a dearth 
in both theories and empirics that explain (1) the complexity within a single constituent 
that could be impactful through multiple and sometimes contradictory expectations on firm 
behaviors, (2) the environmental strategies in the business group form that is prevalent in 
Asian and emerging economies, and (3) how the world’s largest emerging economy, China, 
is addressing its environmental problems in an almost utterly different context than what 
has been explored in the developed western countries. 
In this dissertation, I build on corporate environmentalism, business group, and 
China studies literatures in an attempt to reveal a comprehensive picture of how different 
external and internal forces jointly influence the corporate environmental strategies in the 
emerging economy of China. The first study probes into the complex impact exerted by the 
multiple levels of the Chinese state on corporate environmental practices in Chinese listed 
firms. We argue that different parts of a constituent, such as the different levels of the 
Chinese state in the political bureaucratic structure, do not necessarily align their demands 
when pursuing economic and sustainable development goals. Results from both statistical 
analysis and in-depth interviews show that a firm’s administrative hierarchical distance to 
the central government has an inverted U-shaped effect on corporate environmental 
practices. Such a curvilinear relationship is positively moderated by sectoral or regional 
regulatory stringency a focal firm resides in, and negatively by state financial participation 
in the ownership structure of the listed firms.  
In the second study, I investigate the factors that result in the differences in 
environmental management system adoption by business group affiliates in China. We 
propose and explore two divergent types of mechanisms, pressure sensitivity and pressure 
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resistance, through which business group affiliates respond to environmental compliance 
pressures according to their group-related characteristics. Results from panel data analysis 
reveal that being affiliated with a family-owned business group and having a business 
model centered on business-to-consumer markets renders business group affiliates more 
sensitive to environmental issues, inducing them to adopt formal environmental 
management systems. On the other hand, being a core member of a business group and 
being shielded by corporate political connections make affiliated firms more resistant to 
adopting such systems.  
In sum, findings from these two empirical studies exploring corporate 
environmental strategies in Chinese firms suggest that (1) the Chinese state has multiple 
faces at different levels in the political hierarchy, exerting non-concerted influences on 
corporate environmental practices, (2) there is heterogeneity among Chinese business 
group affiliates on environmental strategies caused by their pressure sensitive and pressure 
resistant attributes. Jointly, these two studies offer a novel, more nuanced understanding of 
the mechanisms that impact corporate environmentalism. The policies at lower state levels 
are more likely to be decoupled from policies issued at higher levels because of different 
interests and development agendas. Furthermore, business group affiliates can be 
simultaneously sensitive and resistant to environmental compliance pressures, depending 
on the types of group-related attributes. The findings from this dissertation are not only 
applicable to China but also to other settings, including developed federal states where 
decentralized autonomy prevails as well as other emerging economies where the business 
group is an important economic force. 
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Samenvatting 
In de afgelopen decennia heeft China indrukwekkende economische ontwikkelingen 
bewerkstelligd. Het land werd echter geconfronteerd met een ongekende, overweldigende 
druk om aandacht te besteden aan de enorme ecologische uitdagingen, zowel vanuit 
binnenlandse als internationale gemeenschappen—des te meer omdat de wereld steeds 
kritischer wordt op het inzetten van niet-duurzame ontwikkelingsstrategieën.  
Hoewel de literatuur op het gebied van milieugedrag van bedrijven duidelijkheid 
biedt over hoe verschillende belanghebbende partijen, zoals overheid, industrie en het 
maatschappelijk middenveld, hun invloed uitoefenen op milieuverantwoord ondernemen in 
ontwikkelde landen, is er een theoretische en empirische schaarste bij de verklaring van (1) 
complexiteit ten gevolge van verschillende en soms tegenstrijdige verwachtingen binnen 
één en dezelfde partij ten aanzien van ondernemingsgedrag, (2) de milieustrategieën in 
bedrijfsgroepen, die veel vóórkomen in Azië en opkomende economieën, en (3) hoe de 
grootste opkomende economie in de wereld, China, haar mileuproblematiek benadert op 
basis van een vrijwel compleet andere context dan die van eerder onderzochte, 
ontwikkelde westerse landen.   
In deze dissertatie gebruik ik de literatuur op het gebied van milieugedrag van 
bedrijven, bedrijfsgroepen en studies over China om te pogen een compleet beeld te 
scheppen van hoe verschillende externe en interne krachten samen invloed uitoefenen op 
milieustrategieën van bedrijven in de opkomende economie van China. De eerste studie 
onderzoekt de complexe invloed die uitgeoefend wordt door diverse niveaus van het 
Chinese overheidssysteem op de milieupraktijken van beursgenoteerde Chinese bedrijven. 
We betogen dat verschillende onderdelen van een belanghebbende, zoals de verschillende 
niveaus van de Chinese overheid in de politiek-bureaucratische structuur, niet zonder meer 
hun aanspraken stroomlijnen bij het nastreven van economische en duurzame 
ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen. Resultaten van zowel statistische analyse als diepte-
interviews laten zien dat de administratief-hiërarchische afstand van een bedrijf tot de 
centrale overheid het effect van een omgekeerde U-vorm heeft op de milieupraktijken van 
bedrijven. Deze curvilineaire relatie wordt positief gemodereerd door de sectorale of 
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regionale striktheid van relevant regelgeving en negatief gemodereerd door financiële 
staatsparticipatie in de eigendomsstructuur van beursgenoteerde bedrijven.  
In de tweede studie onderzoek ik de factoren die resulteren in de verschillen in 
adoptie van milieuzorgsystemen door leden van bedrijfsgroepen in China. We 
onderscheiden en onderzoeken twee verschillende soorten mechanismen, gevoeligheid 
voor druk en weerstand tegen druk, die verklaren hoe leden van bedrijfsgroepen reageren 
op druk om milieuregelgeving na te leven. De resultaten van paneldata-analyse onthullen 
dat het gerelateerd zijn aan een bedrijfsgroep met familiebedrijven en het hebben van een 
ondernemingsmodel dat gericht is op de consumentenmarkt de leden van een 
businessgroep gevoeliger maakt voor milieu-gerelateerde onderwerpen, waardoor zij 
geneigd zijn om formele milieuzorgsystemen in gebruik te nemen. Aan de andere kant 
leiden een kernpositie binnen een bedrijfsgroep en politieke connecties tot meer weerstand 
bij leden van een bedrijfsgroep ten aanzien van de adoptie van zulke systemen.   
In conclusie, de bevindingen van deze twee empirische studies, waarin de 
milieustrategieën van Chinese bedrijven centraal staan, impliceren dat (1) de Chinese 
overheid op verschillende niveaus in de politieke hiërarchie verschillende gezichten heeft, 
die op een niet-gestroomlijnde manier invloed uitoefenen op de milieupraktijken van 
bedrijven, (2) er bestaan verschillen tussen leden van Chinese bedrijfsgroepen inzake 
milieustrategieën ten gevolge van eigenschappen op het gebied van gevoeligheid voor en 
weerstand tegen druk. Samen bieden deze twee studies een vernieuwend, meer 
genuanceerd begrip van de mechanismen die invloed hebben op milieupraktijken van 
bedrijven. Het beleid op lagere overheidsniveaus is eerder losgekoppeld van het beleid op 
hogere niveaus vanwege verschillende belangen en ontwikkelingsagenda’s. Daarnaast 
kunnen leden van bedrijfsgroepen tegelijkertijd gevoelig zijn voor druk als hiertegen 
weerstand bieden, afhankelijk van het type groep-gerelateerde attributen. De bevindingen 
van dit proefschrift zijn niet enkel toepasbaar op China maar ook op andere situaties, 
waaronder ontwikkelde federale staten met hun decentrale autonomie alsmede opkomende 
economieën met hun belangrijke bedrijfsgroepen. 
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概要 (Summary in Chinese) 
 
在过去的几十年里，中国经济完成了跨越式的发展。然而，在世界日益难以容
忍不可持续发展的经济模式的当代，中国也因此正在面临从国际社会到国内社会在
环境保护领域所施与的前所未有的压力。现有文献已完整地研究了诸如政府、行业、
民众等利益相关者在发达国家中如何影响企业环境行为。但我们在理论上和实证上
都还欠缺对以下一系列问题的理解：（1）一个相关者主体内部的复杂结构和其对企
业行为的不一致预期具有何种影响力；（2）亚洲和发展中国家盛行的组织模式—商
业集团—中的企业环境决策；以及（3）在几乎完全不同于西方发达国家的情境中，
世界最有影响力的发展中的经济体—中国—如何处理它的环境问题。 
本论文基于公司环境主义、企业集团以及对中国的以往研究，试图全面展现在
发展中的经济体—中国，外部和内部的诸多因素如何同时影响公司环境决策。研究
一探索中国政府的多层级结构对中国上市公司的企业环境行为的复杂影响。该研究
的主要论点是，在考虑经济发展和可持续发展二者如何平衡的时候，一个利益相关
者主体内的多个部分—诸如组成中国政府的多个政治层级—未必有着一套统一且单
一的主张和需求。本研究的统计分析和深层次的访谈结果都显示，中国上市公司与
中央政府在政治结构中的距离对企业环境行为的影响呈现倒 U型。这种倒 U型影响
会被企业所在地方或行业法规执行的严厉程度正向调节，而被政府控制企业股份的
程度负向调节。 
在研究二中，我考察影响中国企业集团的附属子公司做出是否采用环境管理体
系的不同决策的多种因素。我们提出并探究两种不同的机制：对压力敏感机制、对
压力抵制机制。这两种机制使得企业集团的附属子公司根据自身所具有的商业集团
的相关属性对环境保护带来的压力做出不同的应对决策。面板数据结果显示，作为
家族企业的商业集团的一员、商业模式集中于企业对消费者（B2C），这两者会让
附属子公司对环境类压力更加敏感，从而采用环境管理体系。另一方面，作为一个
商业集团的核心企业、拥有多个政治关联，这两者会使得商业集团子公司抵制采用
环境管理体系。 
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综上所述，本论文中针对中国企业的环境决策的两个实证研究说明：（1）中国
政府在不同的政治层级有不同的主张和需求。这些主张和需求对企业环境行为施加
了各自的、有分别的影响。（2）中国的商业集团附属子公司的环境决策有差异。这
些差异来自于商业集团以及其子公司的对压力敏感和抵制的多个属性。这两个研究
共同提供了一个更复杂、更新颖的视角来研究对公司环境主义的重要影响机制。在
不同的利益和发展策略的影响下，较低层级的政府更有可能与高层级政府不一致。
另外，商业集团的附属公司可以同时既是对环境压力敏感的，又是对环境压力抵制
的—取决于它们的商业集团属性。本论文的研究结果不仅仅适用于中国，也可以扩
展到其他地方政府具有高度自主性的发达联邦制国家，并且对一些商业集团在经济
中占据主导地位的经济体也具有推广意义。 
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Influence on Corporate Environmental Practices in China.  
Wang, R., Heugens, P, and Wijen, F. Differences in Environmental Management System 
Adoption among Chinese Business Group Affiliates.  
Benischke, M., Doh, J., and Wang, R. CSR Status and Acquisition Outcomes. 
Wang, R., and Zhang, J. Political Connections and CSR performances.  
Wang, R., Wijen, F, and Heugens, P. Rule of People versus Rule of Law: the Effectiveness 
of Environmental Institutional Work in China.  
Wang, R., and Wang, P. Social Pressures and Disrupting Work: Dynamics in the Political 
Connections in Chinese Listed Firms.  
 
Research visit 
From October 2016 to May 2017, research visit to the Guanghua School of Management, 
Peking University, invited by Professor Jianjun Zhang. 
 
Teaching and supervising activities 
2016 Sustainable Strategies, MSc. Elective, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus 
University. Number: 42.  
2015 Strategic Management, MSc. student thesis, Rotterdam School of Management, 
Erasmus University. Number of students: 19.  
2015 Strategic Management, BSc. student internship, Rotterdam School of Management, 
Erasmus University. Number of students: 3. 
2014 Strategic Business Plan, BSc. students, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus 
University. Number of students: 64. 
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Conference presentations 
2016 Wang, R. and Heugens, P. Strategic Heterogeneity in environmental management 
system adoption amongst Chinese business group affiliates. SMS (Berlin, Germany). 
2015 Wang, R. and Wijen, F. Responding to Complexity within a State Logic: 
Environmental Responsibility Reporting in China. AOM (Vancouver, Canada).  
2015 Wang, R. and Wijen, F. Multifaceted State Influence on Corporate Environmentalism 
in China. Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (Vancouver, Canada); 
Alliance for Research on Corporate Sustainability 7th Annual Research Conference 
(Chicago, IL).  
2015 Wang, R. The Effectiveness of the Environmental Institutions in China. 31st 
European Group of Organizational Studies Pre-colloquium Workshop (Athens, 
Greece).  
2014 Wang, R. and Wijen, F. Complexity within Logics: The Multiple Influences of the 
Chinese State on Corporate Environmentalism. 30th European Group of 
Organizational Studies Colloquium (Rotterdam, the Netherlands).  
2013 Wang, R. The Diffusion of the Environmental Logic in the Hybrid Organizations. 
Dutch Institutional Theorists Meeting (Tilburg, the Netherlands). 
 
PhD course 
Scientific Integrity  
English 
Advances in the Economics of Entrepreneurship 
Institutional Advantage 
Social Networks and Market Competition  
Applied Econometrics 
Statistical Methods 
Event History & Survival Analysis 
Advanced Qualitative Methods  
Case Studies in Management and Business Research 
 
Language  
Chinese Mandarin: native 
English: proficient 
French: preliminary  
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The ERIM PhD Series 
 
The ERIM PhD Series contains PhD dissertations in the field of Research in Management 
defended at Erasmus University Rotterdam and supervised by senior researchers affiliated 
to the Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM). All dissertations in the ERIM 
PhD Series are available in full text through the ERIM Electronic Series Portal: 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub. ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of 
Management (RSM) and the Erasmus School of Economics at the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam (EUR). 
Dissertations in the last five years 
 
Abbink, E.J., Crew Management in Passenger Rail Transport, Promotors: Prof. L.G. 
Kroon & Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2014-325-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76927 
 
Acar, O.A., Crowdsourcing for Innovation: Unpacking Motivational, Knowledge and   
Relational Mechanisms of Innovative Behavior in Crowdsourcing Platforms, Promotor: 
Prof. J.C.M. van den Ende, EPS-2014-321-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76076 
 
Akin Ates, M., Purchasing and Supply Management at the Purchase Category Level: 
Strategy, structure and performance, Promotors: Prof. J.Y.F. Wynstra & Dr E.M. van 
Raaij, EPS-2014-300-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50283 
 
Akpinar, E., Consumer Information Sharing, Promotor: Prof. A. Smidts, EPS-2013-297-
MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50140 
 
Alexander, L., People, Politics, and Innovation: A Process Perspective, Promotors: Prof. 
H.G. Barkema & Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2014-331-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77209 
 
Alexiou, A. Management of Emerging Technologies and the Learning Organization: 
Lessons from the Cloud and Serious Games Technology, Promotors: Prof. S.J. Magala, 
Prof. M.C. Schippers and Dr I. Oshri, EPS-2016-404-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93818 
 
Almeida e Santos Nogueira, R.J. de, Conditional Density Models Integrating Fuzzy and 
Probabilistic Representations of Uncertainty, Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. J.M.C. 
Sousa, EPS-2014-310-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51560 
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Bannouh, K., Measuring and Forecasting Financial Market Volatility using High-
frequency Data, Promotor: Prof. D.J.C. van Dijk, EPS-2013-273-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38240 
 
Ben-Menahem, S.M., Strategic Timing and Proactiveness of Organizations, Promotors: 
Prof. H.W. Volberda & Prof. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-2013-278-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39128 
 
Benschop, N, Biases in Project Escalation: Names, frames & construal levels, Promotors: 
Prof. K.I.M. Rhode, Prof. H.R. Commandeur, Prof. M. Keil & Dr A.L.P. Nuijten,  
EPS-2015-375-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79408 
 
Berg, W.E. van den, Understanding Salesforce Behavior using Genetic Association Studies, 
Promotor: Prof. W.J.M.I. Verbeke, EPS-2014-311-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51440 
 
Beusichem, H.C. van, Firms and Financial Markets: Empirical Studies on the 
Informational Value of Dividends, Governance and Financial Reporting, Promotors: Prof. 
A. de Jong & Dr G. Westerhuis, EPS-2016-378-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93079 
 
Bliek, R. de, Empirical Studies on the Economic Impact of Trust, Promotor: Prof. 
J. Veenman & Prof. Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2015-324-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78159 
 
Boons, M., Working Together Alone in the Online Crowd: The Effects of Social 
Motivations and Individual Knowledge Backgrounds on the Participation and 
Performance of Members of Online Crowdsourcing Platforms, Promotors: Prof. H.G. 
Barkema & Dr D.A. Stam, EPS-2014-306-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50711 
 
Brazys, J., Aggregated Marcoeconomic News and Price Discovery, Promotor: Prof. 
W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-351-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78243 
 
Byington, E., Exploring Coworker Relationships: Antecedents and Dimensions of 
Interpersonal Fit, Coworker Satisfaction, and Relational Models, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van 
Knippenberg, EPS-2013-292-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41508 
 
Cancurtaran, P., Essays on Accelerated Product Development, Promotors: Prof. F. 
Langerak & Prof. G.H. van Bruggen, EPS-2014-317-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76074 
 
Caron, E.A.M., Explanation of Exceptional Values in Multi-dimensional Business 
Databases, Promotors: Prof. H.A.M. Daniels & Prof. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2013-296-
LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50005 
 
Carvalho, L. de, Knowledge Locations in Cities: Emergence and Development Dynamics, 
Promotor: Prof. L. Berg, EPS-2013-274-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38449 
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Cranenburgh, K.C. van, Money or Ethics: Multinational corporations and religious 
organisations operating in an era of corporate responsibility, Prof. L.C.P.M. Meijs, Prof. 
R.J.M. van Tulder & Dr D. Arenas, EPS-2016-385-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93104 
 
Consiglio, I., Others: Essays on Interpersonal and Consumer Behavior, Promotor:  
Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2016-366-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79820 
 
Cox, R.H.G.M., To Own, To Finance, and To Insure - Residential Real Estate Revealed, 
Promotor: Prof. D. Brounen, EPS-2013-290-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/40964 
 
Darnihamedani, P. Individual Characteristics, Contextual Factors and Entrepreneurial 
Behavior, Promotors: Prof. A.R. Thurik & S.J.A. Hessels, EPS-2016-360-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93280 
 
Deng, W., Social Capital and Diversification of Cooperatives, Promotor:  
Prof. G.W.J. Hendrikse, EPS-2015-341-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77449 
 
Depecik, B.E., Revitalizing brands and brand: Essays on Brand and Brand Portfolio 
Management Strategies, Promotors: Prof. G.H. van Bruggen, Dr Y.M. van Everdingen and 
Dr M.B. Ataman, EPS-2016-406-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93507 
 
Dollevoet, T.A.B., Delay Management and Dispatching in Railways, Promotor: Prof. 
A.P.M. Wagelmans, EPS-2013-272-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38241 
 
Duyvesteyn, J.G. Empirical Studies on Sovereign Fixed Income Markets, Promotors: Prof. 
P.Verwijmeren & Prof. M.P.E. Martens, EPS-2015-361-F&A, hdl.handle.net/1765/79033 
 
Duursema, H., Strategic Leadership: Moving Beyond the Leader-Follower Dyad, 
Promotor: Prof. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2013-279-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39129 
 
Elemes, A, Studies on Determinants and Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality, 
Promotor: Prof. E. Peek, EPS-2015-354-F&A, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79037 
 
Ellen, S. ter, Measurement, Dynamics, and Implications of Heterogeneous Beliefs in 
Financial Markets, Promotor: Prof. W.F.C. Verschoor, EPS-2015-343-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78191 
 
Erlemann, C., Gender and Leadership Aspiration: The Impact of the Organizational 
Environment, Promotor: Prof. D.L. van Knippenberg, EPS-2016-376-ORG,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79409 
 
Eskenazi, P.I., The Accountable Animal, Promotor: Prof. F.G.H. Hartmann, EPS- 
2015-355-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78300 
 
Evangelidis, I., Preference Construction under Prominence, Promotor: Prof. S.M.J. 
van Osselaer, EPS-2015-340-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78202 
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Faber, N., Structuring Warehouse Management, Promotors: Prof. M.B.M. de Koster & 
Prof. A. Smidts, EPS-2015-336-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78603 
 
Fernald, K., The Waves of Biotechnological Innovation in Medicine: Interfirm 
Cooperation Effects and a Venture Capital Perspective, Promotors: Prof. E. Claassen, Prof. 
H.P.G. Pennings & Prof. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2015-371-S&E,  
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79120 
 
Fisch, C.O., Patents and trademarks: Motivations, antecedents, and value in industrialized 
and emerging markets, Promotors: Prof. J.H. Block, Prof. H.P.G.  Pennings & Prof. A.R. 
Thurik, EPS-2016-397-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94036 
 
Fliers, P.T., Essays on Financing and Performance: The role of firms, banks and board, 
Promotor: Prof. A. de Jong & Prof. P.G.J. Roosenboom, EPS-2016-388-F&A,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93019 
 
Fourne, S.P., Managing Organizational Tensions: A Multi-Level Perspective on 
Exploration, Exploitation and Ambidexterity, Promotors: Prof. J.J.P. Jansen & Prof. 
S.J. Magala, EPS-2014-318-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76075 
 
Gaast, J.P. van der, Stochastic Models for Order Picking Systems, Promotors: Prof. M.B.M 
de Koster & Prof. I.J.B.F. Adan, EPS-2016-398-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/93222 
 
Glorie, K.M., Clearing Barter Exchange Markets: Kidney Exchange and Beyond, 
Promotors: Prof. A.P.M. Wagelmans & Prof. J.J. van de Klundert, EPS-2014-329-LIS, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77183 
 
Hekimoglu, M., Spare Parts Management of Aging Capital Products, Promotor: Prof. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2015-368-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79092 
 
Heyde Fernandes, D. von der, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Reminders, Promotor: 
Prof. S.M.J. van Osselaer, EPS-2013-295-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/41514 
  
Hogenboom, A.C., Sentiment Analysis of Text Guided by Semantics and Structure, 
Promotors: Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. F.M.G. de Jong, EPS-2015-369-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79034 
 
Hogenboom, F.P., Automated Detection of Financial Events in News Text, Promotors: 
Prof. U. Kaymak & Prof. F.M.G. de Jong, EPS-2014-326-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77237 
 
Hollen, R.M.A., Exploratory Studies into Strategies to Enhance Innovation-Driven 
International Competitiveness in a Port Context: Toward Ambidextrous Ports, Promotors: 
Prof. F.A.J. Van Den Bosch & Prof. H.W.Volberda, EPS-2015-372-S&E,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78881 
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Hout, D.H. van, Measuring Meaningful Differences: Sensory Testing Based Decision 
Making in an Industrial Context; Applications of Signal Detection Theory and Thurstonian 
Modelling, Promotors: Prof. P.J.F. Groenen & Prof. G.B. Dijksterhuis, EPS- 
2014-304-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50387 
 
Houwelingen, G.G. van, Something To Rely On, Promotors: Prof. D. de Cremer & 
Prof. M.H. van Dijke, EPS-2014-335-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77320 
 
Hurk, E. van der, Passengers, Information, and Disruptions, Promotors: Prof. L.G. 
Kroon & Prof. P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2015-345-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78275 
 
Iseger, P. den, Fourier and Laplace Transform Inversion with Applications in Finance, 
Promotor: Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2014-322-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76954 
 
Jaarsveld, W.L. van, Maintenance Centered Service Parts Inventory Control, Promotor: 
Prof. R. Dekker, EPS-2013-288-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/39933 
 
Khanagha, S., Dynamic Capabilities for Managing Emerging Technologies, Promotor: 
Prof. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2014-339-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77319 
 
Kil, J., Acquisitions Through a Behavioral and Real Options Lens, Promotor: Prof. 
H.T.J. Smit, EPS-2013-298-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50142 
 
Klooster, E. van’t, Travel to Learn: the Influence of Cultural Distance on Competence 
Development in Educational Travel, Promotors: Prof. F.M. Go & Prof. P.J. van 
Baalen, EPS-2014-312-MKT, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51462 
 
Koendjbiharie, S.R., The Information-Based View on Business Network Performance: 
Revealing the Performance of Interorganizational Networks, Promotors: Prof. 
H.W.G.M. van Heck & Prof. P.H.M. Vervest, EPS-2014-315-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/51751 
 
Koning, M., The Financial Reporting Environment: The Role of the Media, Regulators 
and Auditors, Promotors: Prof. G.M.H. Mertens & Prof. P.G.J. Roosenboom, 
EPS-2014-330-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77154 
 
Konter, D.J., Crossing Borders with HRM: An Inquiry of the Influence of Contextual 
Differences in the Adoption and Effectiveness of HRM, Promotors: Prof. J. Paauwe 
& Dr L.H. Hoeksema, EPS-2014-305-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/50388 
 
Korkmaz, E., Bridging Models and Business: Understanding Heterogeneity in Hidden 
Drivers of Customer Purchase Behavior, Promotors: Prof. S.L. van de Velde & 
Prof. D. Fok, EPS-2014-316-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/76008 
 
Krämer, R., A license to mine? Community organizing against multinational corporations, 
Promotors: Prof. R.J.M. van Tulder & Prof. G.M. Whiteman, EPS-2016-383-ORG, 
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/94072 
ERIM PhD Series 
128 
 
 
Kroezen, J.J., The Renewal of Mature Industries: An Examination of the Revival of the 
Dutch Beer Brewing Industry, Promotor: Prof. P.P.M.A.R. Heugens, EPS-2014- 
333-S&E, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77042 
 
Kysucky, V., Access to Finance in a Cros-Country Context, Promotor: Prof. L. Norden, 
EPS-2015-350-F&A, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78225 
 
Lee, C.I.S.G, Big Data in Management Research: Exploring New Avenues, Promotors: 
Prof. S.J. Magala & Dr W.A. Felps, EPS-2016-365-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/79818 
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2015-362-ORG, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/78649 
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Ma, Y., The Use of Advanced Transportation Monitoring Data for Official Statistics, 
Promotors: Prof. L.G. Kroon and Dr J. van Dalen, EPS-2016-391-LIS,  
http://repub.eur.nl/pub/80174 
ERIM PhD Series 
129 
 
 
Manders, B., Implementation and Impact of ISO 9001, Promotor: Prof. K. Blind, 
EPS-2014-337-LIS, http://repub.eur.nl/pub/77412 
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has multiple faces at different levels in the political hierarchy, exerting non-concerted influences on 
corporate environmental practices, (2) there is heterogeneity among Chinese business group affiliates on 
environmental strategies caused by their pressure sensitive and pressure resistant attributes. 
Jointly, these two studies offer a novel, more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms that impact 
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